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By Ramadan Elmi

With children facing acute malnutrition in Buurhakaba and a possible Super El Niño threatening communities along the Juba and Shabelle rivers, coordinated action by government, communities, businesses and the diaspora is urgently needed.

Somalia is facing two connected emergencies. Repeatedly poor or failed rainy seasons over the past three years have deepened drought, hunger and displacement. At the same time, forecasts pointing to a possible Super El Niño in 2026 raise the risk of heavy rainfall and destructive flooding, particularly along the Juba and Shabelle rivers.

The cruel reality is that communities weakened by drought may soon face the opposite extreme. Families that have lost livestock, crops and income could be displaced again by rising rivers and flash floods. Somalia cannot afford to treat drought and flooding as separate emergencies. They are part of the same recurring cycle of vulnerability.

Buurhakaba has become one of the starkest centres of the current drought. Many children are facing acute malnutrition, while insecurity and access restrictions make the town and its surrounding communities extremely difficult to reach. Families are being pushed deeper into crisis while government institutions and humanitarian organisations struggle to deliver assistance.

When a community is already confronting hunger, malnutrition and restricted access, even a modest additional shock can have devastating consequences.

Lessons that must lead to action

Experience from the 2023 floods and other recent emergencies points to a continuing gap between early warning and early action. Although response efforts have saved lives, Somalia’s disaster-management system remains more focused on mobilising assistance after an emergency than on reducing risks beforehand.

Fifteen years ago, my 2011 commentary—Will the Prevailing Somali Solidarity on Famine Response Remain?—questioned whether national solidarity would endure beyond the immediate emergency. Somalia is now confronting the same dilemma: concern and resources surge when a crisis becomes visible, but long-term preparedness, capable institutions and early financing remain too weak. The country cannot afford to keep rediscovering the same lesson after lives and livelihoods have already been lost.

The priority now must be to translate previous experience into sustained preparedness, supported by capable institutions, contingency financing, pre-positioned supplies and clear arrangements for action at the local level.

Somalia cannot continue moving from drought response to flood response and then back to drought response. This cycle consumes limited resources while leaving the underlying vulnerabilities largely unchanged. Breaking it requires a long-term national plan supported by capable, responsive and properly resourced institutions.

The lesson from previous emergencies is clear: preparations must be completed before the water rises. Evacuation routes, temporary shelters, emergency transport, food, medicines and clean-water supplies must be identified and prepared in advance. Local administrations and communities need to understand their responsibilities, where vulnerable families will be relocated and how assistance will reach them.

Current planning estimates suggest that as many as 1.3 million people living along the Juba and Shabelle river systems could be exposed to flooding or require evacuation if the projected conditions materialise. Moving and supporting a population of this scale cannot be improvised after rivers begin overflowing. It requires advance planning, trusted communication, functioning institutions and resources positioned close to the communities facing the greatest risk.

Building on preparedness already under way

The preparedness work already under way is valuable, including the establishment of national task forces to coordinate planning for a possible Super El Niño. These efforts provide an important foundation for bringing together federal institutions, Federal Member States, local administrations, humanitarian organisations, businesses and community representatives.

However, these coordination structures must be properly resourced, assigned clear responsibilities and connected to operational systems at district and village levels. National plans must produce practical results: timely warnings, mapped evacuation routes, safe temporary shelters, pre-positioned supplies and transport arrangements for people who cannot evacuate themselves.

Preparedness should be measured not only by the plans developed at the national level but by what reaches communities facing the danger. A warning has little value if a family does not know where to go, cannot afford transport or finds no shelter or assistance after leaving its home.

Temporary shelters should therefore be established and supplied before evacuation begins. They must provide safe accommodation, clean water, sanitation, food, basic health services and protection for women, children, older people and persons with disabilities. Arrangements must also be made to protect livestock and household property, as these concerns often influence whether families agree to leave.

Evacuation is only the first stage. Planning must also cover what happens afterwards: safe return, rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, restoration of livelihoods and support for communities recovering from repeated displacement.

Evacuation will require public trust

One of the greatest challenges will not be producing warnings but persuading people to act on them. Residents may question whether flooding is certain to occur. Because forecasts indicate risk rather than guarantee an outcome, some people may decide to remain and take their chances.

This reaction is sometimes associated with the Insha’Allahphenomenon—the belief that nothing will happen unless Allah wills it. Faith itself is not the problem. The deeper challenge is a combination of uncertainty, previous experience, attachment to homes and livestock, and mistrust of government institutions and aid organisations.

Families may hesitate to leave if they do not know where they will be taken, whether their property will be protected or whether assistance will be available at the evacuation site. Warnings will only be credible when they are accompanied by practical answers to these concerns.

Government announcements alone will not be enough. Religious scholars, traditional elders, women’s organisations, youth leaders and other trusted community figures should be involved from the beginning. Religious leaders can help explain that faith and precaution are not in conflict: preparing for danger and protecting life are responsibilities, not expressions of doubt.

Somalia’s telecommunications infrastructure provides an important advantage. SoDMA and telecommunications companies can distribute location-specific warnings through text messages, telephone calls and social media. These should be reinforced through radio, mosques and direct community engagement.

Messages must be clear, consistent and tailored to the conditions in each area. People should be told what the danger is, when it may occur, where they should go and what assistance will be available. Simply announcing that flooding may happen will not persuade families to evacuate.

Taking coordination to the village

SoDMA’s National Emergency Operations Centre continues to operate and already plays an important coordination role. It nevertheless requires greater resources, stronger technical capabilities, sufficient trained personnel, dependable equipment and improved information-management and communication systems.

The emergency coordination system must also extend throughout the country. Disasters happen in localities, not in national offices. Warnings and operational instructions must travel from the national centre through Federal Member States and districts to individual villages. At the same time, information about river levels, population movements and urgent needs must travel quickly from communities back to decision-makers.

Local administrations are the first institutional responders to emergencies. They understand the geography, population and local movement patterns. They should be equipped to identify vulnerable households, map evacuation routes, prepare safe locations, coordinate transport and communicate with remote settlements.

Families, neighbours and local leaders will usually provide the first immediate response. Local administrations must therefore work closely with elders, religious leaders, women’s organisations, youth groups and civil society networks. Strengthening this local capacity is essential for both emergency response and longer-term recovery.

The danger begins upstream

Much of the water flowing through the Juba and Shabelle rivers originates from rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands. River levels in Somalia can therefore rise because of heavy rainfall upstream, even before significant rain begins inside Somalia.

This upstream dimension must become part of the wider approach to water management between Somalia and Ethiopia. The two countries need stronger arrangements for sharing rainfall forecasts, river-level information and advance warnings about major changes in water flows.

Communities downstream should not experience severe water shortages during dry seasons and then face sudden, poorly communicated increases in water during periods of heavy rainfall. Better arrangements are needed for managing low flows, water storage and the timing of major upstream releases.

This is not simply a diplomatic or technical matter. It directly concerns the safety and livelihoods of entire communities living along vulnerable river embankments. Regular information-sharing between the two countries could give Somali authorities and riverine communities valuable time to prepare and evacuate.

The immediate plan may be to move people to safety and support their recovery afterwards. But without better cross-border water management, improved river infrastructure and sustained investment in prevention, Somalia will continue repeating the same emergency response.

Rising food prices could deepen the crisis

The wider international environment is making Somalia’s situation more dangerous. Conflict in the Middle East and disruption to regional shipping routes can increase fuel, transport and insurance costs, adding further pressure to food prices.

Somalia depends heavily on food imported from outside the country. International disruptions therefore quickly reach Somali markets. For a family already affected by drought, livestock losses or displacement, higher food prices can mean eating fewer meals, withdrawing children from school or selling the few productive assets that remain.

Food-price inflation will also increase the cost of humanitarian operations at the very moment when needs are rising. Preparedness must therefore include close monitoring of food markets, protection of essential supply routes, advance purchasing of critical supplies and targeted support for the most vulnerable households.

Over the longer term, Somalia must invest more seriously in domestic food production, water management and livelihood diversification. Reducing dependence on imported food is not only an economic objective; it is an essential part of national resilience.

A priority above political differences

Political and electoral issues continue to dominate national attention. Yet protecting people from drought, hunger and possible flooding must now become the country’s immediate priority. Political differences should be set aside so that leadership, resources and institutional capacity can be mobilised around a common national plan.

The efforts already under way are important, but they may not be enough for a crisis of this potential scale. Preparedness requires funding, clear leadership and accountability. Every responsible institution must understand what it is expected to deliver and by when.

Somalia is also confronting a changing international aid landscape. External assistance has become less predictable as donor countries increasingly focus on their own economic, political and security challenges. International partners will remain important, but Somalia can no longer build its emergency planning around the assumption that outside assistance will always arrive at the required scale or at the right time.

The country must adapt quickly by strengthening its own institutions, mobilising domestic resources and investing in preparedness before disasters occur.

The Somali expression “Ninwalbow naftaa, Nabiyow Ummadaa”speaks powerfully to this moment. Somalia must take greater responsibility for charting its own way through these crises.

That responsibility cannot rest with government alone. The private sector can provide telecommunications, transport, equipment and supply networks. The diaspora can contribute financing, technical expertise and international connections. Religious leaders and elders can strengthen public confidence, while civil society organisations can reach communities that formal institutions may struggle to access.

Somalia has received the warning, and there is still time to act. The real test will not be the number of plans, meetings or task forces established. It will be whether a malnourished child in Buurhakaba receives assistance, whether a riverine family trusts an evacuation warning and whether local authorities have the resources to act before drought today becomes catastrophic flooding tomorrow.

Ramadan Elmi is Senior Consultant in Humanitarian Affairs, Community Development, Governance, Stabilisation and Early Recovery. Ha can be reached at ramadan.elmi@outlook.com | Substack: @ramadanelmi | X: @ramadanElmi

 

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