By Abdullahi Yabarow
The Federal Supreme Court’s decision in the Galmudug election case should prompt Somalia to reconsider the institutional design underpinning its move towards one person, one vote. The case was not only about the cancellation of a regional poll. It revealed a more serious weakness in the machinery now expected to deliver direct elections. In MSF/DD/1/2026, delivered on 24 August 2026, the Court examined the combined Galmudug parliamentary and local council elections held on 30 July 2026. It found that the process had breached the governing electoral framework and, acting under Article 82 of the Electoral Law, declared the result invalid. Article 82 lends that conclusion legal force because an election conducted outside the required framework cannot constitute a valid exercise of public authority.
Article 73 of the Electoral Law also strengthens the significance of the case. It gives the Supreme Court authority over election-related disputes, including participation rights, final results, and appeals against the electoral body’s administrative decisions. Galmudug was therefore not a political disagreement placed before the judiciary for convenience. It was a legality dispute of the kind the statute assigns to the country’s highest court.
The judgment matters because it shifts the debate from accusation to legality. An election does not become valid because ballot papers are printed, polling centres open, and results are announced. It becomes valid when the institution that administers it complies with the rules conferring legal authority on the vote. The concerns in Galmudug touched the foundations of electoral legitimacy: statutory compliance, timing, nomination procedures, voter information, polling arrangements and access to complaint mechanisms. In electoral law, procedure is substance. If those safeguards fail, voting may occur, yet the authority claimed from the result remains doubtful.
This is why reform of the present electoral body is now necessary, not merely desirable. A commission whose failures contribute to judicial invalidation cannot restore confidence by promising better management at the next contest. The problem is structural. It concerns appointments, finances, logistics, security coordination, and the confidence of those who compete before it. A body that relies on executive discretion or is widely perceived as close to one political sidecannot convincingly supervise an election in which that side has a direct interest.
Independence must be visible in both structure and conduct. It is not enough for legislation to call an institution independent. The public must be able to see how that independence is protected in practice. The question is not whether every commissioner is personally biased. The deeper issue is whether opposition parties, federal member states, candidates, observers and voters can trust the referee even when they lose. If they believe the referee is on the incumbent camp’s side, the election is weakened before polling day begins.
Somalia therefore needs a new electoral commission formed through a negotiated settlement among the federal government, opposition parties and federal member states. Such a model should not become a crude sharing of seats among political actors. Its purpose should be to prevent capture by any single camp. A body created through unilateral appointment cannot carry the burden of national suffrage in a divided political environment. One formed through broad consent has a stronger claim to public acceptance.
A tripartite appointment framework reflects Somalia’s constitutional reality. The federal government carries national responsibility for the transition. Opposition parties must have confidence in the institution before which they compete. Federal member states cannot be treated as spectators in a federal system in which elections depend on local administration, public acceptance, and security cooperation. Each side should take part in nomination and scrutiny, with final confirmation carried out through a transparent legal process. Civil society, the legal profession, and independent constitutional experts may assist with vetting, but the foundation must be consent-based enough to prevent domination.
Once reconstituted, the commission must be protected by law. Its budget should be secured against executive obstruction. Its electoral calendar should be issued early and followed. Voter registration must be verifiable. Nomination rules must remain clear and stable. Polling arrangements should change only for lawful and publicly explained reasons. Decisions should be reasoned, published and open to timely challenge. Electoral law cannot be treated as something to adjust whenever it becomes politically inconvenient. It is the boundary between democratic competition and administrative control.
A second reform is also required. Somalia needs an Independent Election and Security Task Force with a statutory mandate to safeguard the electoral environment. The Galmudug judgment shows why this responsibility cannot be left to the commission alone. Electoral legality depends not only on calendars, forms and declarations, but also on whether the conditions around the vote are secure and fair. If polling centres can be controlled, party agents obstructed, observers restricted, ballot materials mishandled, registration figures left unverified or security personnel deployed unevenly, even a reformed commission may struggle to deliver a credible process.
Security is not a background issue in Somali elections. It can decide whether polling stations open safely, whether ballot materials remain protected, whether voters feel free from intimidation, whether parties can monitor the process, and whether violations can be recorded before evidence disappears. A commission cannot act independently if the environment around it is shaped by partisan command. A separate body is needed, not to replace the commission, but to protect the conditions in which the commission can lawfully perform its duties.
The Task Force should not register voters, count votes or declare winners. Those functions must remain with the electoral commission. Its role should be to secure registration centres, polling stations, counting venues, ballot materials and result transmission channels, while also verifying the integrity of registration figures, turnout records, ballot custody and transmission procedures. It should guarantee access for accredited party agents, observers, journalists and monitors. Where intimidation, obstruction, unlawful relocation of polling sites, interference by local officials or misuse of police personnel occurs, the breach should be documented and referred to prosecutors, electoral dispute bodies or courts.
Its composition must be balanced. Federal and state security institutions should participate, but neither should dominate. Neutral legal officers, prosecutorial or judicial representatives and independent monitors should be included. International technical advisers may assist where necessary, but operational control during the electoral period must be insulated from ministers, regional presidents, district commissioners, party leaders and candidates. A government contesting an election should not control the security conditions under which its rivals are expected to campaign and vote.
These two reforms would support each other. The new commission would administer the election with legitimacy derived from agreement among the government, the opposition, and the federal member states. The Task Force would protect the process from coercion, obstruction, inflated claims of participation, mishandled materials, and partisan interference. Courts would remain the final forum for legal disputes, but they should not be left to repair elections after avoidable failures have already damaged public confidence.
The Galmudug judgment should leave no institution comfortable with the present design. Somalia cannot build credible direct elections through a commission trusted by only one side, or through security arrangements vulnerable to political command. Universal suffrage requires more than the act of voting. It requires lawful administration, an impartial referee, a secure environment, verifiable electoral data and remedies available before illegality hardens into a disputed result.
Somalia now needs a new electoral settlement: a tripartite commission negotiated between the federal government, opposition parties and federal member states, supported by an independent body responsible for safeguarding election security and verifying the integrity of the process. Without those reforms, one person, one vote may remain a constitutional promise without institutional force. The Galmudug judgment should be read as a warning before the next election, not merely as a ruling on the last one.
Adv. Abdullahi Yabarow, LL.M., is a legal scholar based in the United Kingdom. His research focuses on constitutional law, governance reform, institutional accountability, and state building in fragile states. He can be reached via email: abdullahiyabarow@gmail.com