El Alamein Summit, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the UAE—and the price Somalia pays for internal political fragmentation.
Somalia is entering one of the most consequential geopolitical periods since the establishment of the federal system in 2012. Its participation in the El Alamein Summit has placed it within an increasingly important strategic framework around the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, while its relationships with Türkiye, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are expanding simultaneously.
Yet Somalia’s greatest strategic vulnerability may not be external. It may be internal.
Somalia possesses an extraordinary geographical position: a long coastline facing the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, proximity to the Bab al-Mandab, and a strategic location between the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa and the markets of landlocked Ethiopia. These assets explain the growing interest of regional powers.
But Somalia remains politically divided over the constitutional order, the distribution of authority between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, and the rules governing elections and political transition.
The result is a fundamental paradox: Somalia is becoming more geopolitically important at precisely the moment when its internal political settlement is under increasing strain.
El Alamein and Somalia’s emerging Red Sea role
The El Alamein Summit is important because several of its outcomes correspond directly with Somalia’s strategic interests. The participating states reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, rejected recognition or support for Somaliland, supported Somalia’s counter-terrorism efforts and called for sustainable financing for AUSSOM. The summit also emphasized the responsibility of Red Sea littoral states for the security and governance of the maritime space.
For Somalia, these are significant diplomatic gains.
But El Alamein also demonstrates the complexity of Somali diplomacy. Egypt’s strategic interests extend beyond Somalia to the Nile, Sudan and Ethiopia. Ethiopia, meanwhile, is both a major regional competitor of Egypt and Somalia’s most consequential neighbour.
Somalia therefore needs to distinguish between issues in which its national interests coincide with those of another state and disputes in which Somalia risks becoming an instrument of another country’s strategy.
That distinction should become a central principle of Somali foreign policy.
Five powers and five different interests
Ethiopia is not simply another external actor. It is Somalia’s largest and most consequential neighbour and a potential economic partner of enormous importance. Ethiopia’s search for reliable maritime access could create opportunities for Somali ports, logistics, customs revenues and regional trade.
Ethiopian leaders have always recognised that a populous country with an expanding economy requires maritime access to prevent its growth from being stifled, and there is where Somalia can be a useful to Ethiopia.
The Ankara process provided a framework for discussing Ethiopian maritime access while reaffirming Somali sovereignty. The challenge is to ensure that commercial access does not become confused with territorial control. Somalia should seek to turn Ethiopia’s maritime requirements into long-term Somali economic leverage, rather than treating them exclusively as a security threat.
Egypt has become another important security and diplomatic partner. Cairo has strongly supported Somalia’s territorial integrity and expanded military cooperation with Mogadishu. Its support gives Somalia an important diplomatic counterweight on sovereignty issues.
But Egypt’s relationship with Somalia must also be viewed against the background of its strategic dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Somalia can cooperate with Egypt on Somali sovereignty and Red Sea security without becoming a proxy in the Nile dispute.
Türkiye occupies a different position. Its engagement combines defence, maritime security, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, commerce and diplomacy. The ten-year defence and economic cooperation framework signed in 2024 includes support for developing, training and equipping the Somali navy.
This is strategically important because Somalia cannot convert its coastline into national power without maritime capacity. A functioning navy and coast guard could protect territorial waters, combat piracy and illegal fishing, secure shipping and enable Somalia to develop its fisheries and blue economy.
The objective, however, should be to build Somali capacity, not permanent dependence on an external security provider.
The UAE represents another form of influence, centred particularly on investment, ports, logistics and maritime networks. UAE-linked investment in the Horn demonstrates the commercial value of Somalia’s wider maritime geography. Yet relations between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi have also deteriorated, illustrating the risks when commercial, security and political interests become intertwined.
For Somalia, Gulf investment can provide capital and infrastructure. The danger arises when external economic relationships become linked to competing Somali political authorities or contribute to institutional fragmentation.
Saudi Arabia should now be regarded as a fifth major actor. The expansion of Saudi-Somali defence and maritime cooperation reflects Riyadh’s growing interest in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Saudi Arabia can potentially contribute investment, maritime security, defence cooperation, food security, logistics and access to Gulf markets.
But Saudi Arabia and the UAE are themselves increasingly competitive across parts of the Horn. Somalia should therefore avoid turning Gulf rivalry into Somali rivalry. The correct policy is not to choose between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but to establish national rules under which both can engage Somalia without undermining Somali institutions.
The hidden variable: Somalia’s internal fragmentation
The central weakness in Somalia’s foreign policy is therefore not simply the behaviour of external powers. It is the absence of sufficient domestic political consensus.
Somalia’s federal system remains contested. The Constitution established federalism but left important questions concerning the division of powers unresolved. These ambiguities have contributed to recurring disputes between the Federal Government and Federal Member States.
The current disagreements over constitutional amendments, elections, political mandates and the distribution of authority demonstrate the problem.
Opposition groups and some Federal Member States, particularly Puntland and Jubaland, have disputed aspects of the Federal Government’s approach to constitutional and electoral reform. These disagreements are not merely procedural disputes over elections. They concern the legitimacy and institutional structure of the Somali state itself. This has direct foreign-policy consequences.
A foreign government negotiating with Mogadishu may find that a Federal Member State disputes the Federal Government’s authority over the issue concerned. External investors may encounter competing authorities. Security partnerships may develop along different institutional lines. Political actors may seek support from different foreign powers.
One Somalia internationally, but several centres of political authority domestically weakens Somalia’s bargaining power.
Federalism is therefore a foreign-policy issue
A fragmented federation creates at least five strategic costs.
First, it increases the possibility of competing security partnerships, with different Somali authorities relying on different external actors.
Second, it encourages fragmented port diplomacy, allowing foreign investors and governments to negotiate separately with different political authorities.
Third, it reduces Somalia’s bargaining power. External actors become stronger when Somali political actors compete for their support.
Fourth, it increases the risk of proxy politics, in which domestic political disputes become connected to regional rivalries.
Finally, it weakens sovereignty itself. A state that repeatedly requires external actors to mediate its internal constitutional disputes becomes more dependent upon those same actors.
This is why Somalia’s electoral disagreement should be understood as a national-security issue.
The question of whether elections are direct or indirect, when they take place, who controls the electoral process and how the Federal Government and Federal Member States share authority is not simply an issue of political competition. It determines the legitimacy and coherence of the state that negotiates with the outside world.
Turning geopolitical competition into national advantage
Somalia nevertheless has a remarkable opportunity. Five important regional powers have strategic interests that can potentially be converted into Somali benefits:
- Türkiye: defence, maritime capacity, infrastructure and diplomatic mediation;
- Egypt: sovereignty, security and Red Sea cooperation;
- Ethiopia: trade, transit and port access;
- Saudi Arabia: investment, maritime security and Gulf markets;
- UAE: capital, logistics and commercial networks.
The objective should not be to choose one partner against another.
Instead, Somalia needs a policy of strategic non-exclusivity: constructive relations with all while remaining dependent on none.
Every major external agreement should be assessed against five national objectives: jobs, revenue, infrastructure, technology transfer and institutional capacity.
A port agreement should increase Somali revenues and employment. A defence agreement should build Somali capabilities. A foreign investment project should contribute to productive capacity. A regional trade agreement should strengthen exports and logistics.
The measure of foreign policy should therefore not be the number of agreements signed, but the amount of Somali national capacity those agreements create.
From geopolitical object to geopolitical actor
Somalia’s greatest strategic asset is its geography. But geography becomes power only when supported by institutions.
A coastline without maritime security is vulnerable. A port without efficient customs produces limited national value. A trade corridor without infrastructure cannot generate sufficient revenue. And a strategically located country without political cohesion risks becoming an arena in which others pursue their interests.
Somalia is no longer peripheral to Red Sea politics. Ethiopia needs maritime access; Türkiye seeks a long-term security relationship; Egypt wants a stable Somalia and secure Red Sea; Saudi Arabia wants stronger Red Sea partnerships; and the UAE remains an important commercial actor in the Horn.
These interests can coexist with Somali national interests—but only if Somalia itself has the institutional capacity to define the terms.
Consequently, constitutional consensus is itself a foreign-policy and national-security asset.
Somalia cannot build strategic autonomy abroad while remaining politically divided at home. A sufficiently inclusive political settlement between the Federal Government, opposition and Federal Member States would strengthen Somalia’s negotiating position with every external actor.
The strategic objective should therefore not be to choose between Egypt and Ethiopia, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, or Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
It should be to make Somalia’s strategic geography and partnership to work for Somalia —but subordinate to no one.
If Somalia can resolve its constitutional and electoral disputes, clarify federal responsibilities, establish coherent national institutions and pursue a balanced foreign policy, the current competition surrounding the country could generate ports, investment, employment, maritime security and diplomatic influence.
If political fragmentation persists, the same geopolitical competition could deepen dependency, institutional rivalry and proxy politics.
The ultimate choice is therefore not between five external powers.
It is whether Somalia will remain an arena in which others compete—or become a state capable of making that competition work for the Somali national interest.
Abdullahi Hamud
Deputy Chairman, Xaqsoor Party
Former State Minister, Office of the Prime Minister, Federal Government of Somalia
e-mail: abdullahi-hamud@outlook.com
