The recent arrival of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) in Djibouti, greeted by President Ismail Omar Guelleh, was publicly framed by Villa Somalia with the usual diplomatic platitudes—a mission to “strengthen long-standing bilateral relations.” However, behind the carefully constructed smiles and handshakes, credible sources suggest a far more alarming geopolitical gambit is unfolding.
This visit, convened urgently at Guelleh’s request, may not be about bolstering fraternal ties but rather about Djibouti strategically offloading immense military and political risk onto its already embattled neighbor, Somalia. The stakes involve plunging Somalia into the heart of the volatile Red Sea conflict against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, a war it can ill afford and from which Djibouti itself desperately seeks insulation.
Djibouti’s Calculated Deflection
Credible reports depict Djibouti as a nation acutely aware of its precarious geopolitical value, maneuvering to protect itself. Hosting critical military bases for Western powers, including the cornerstone U.S. Camp Lemonnier, and China, Djibouti sits astride the vital Bab-el-Mandeb Strait—a chokepoint for global maritime trade. However, Djibouti finds itself uncomfortably close to the expanding theater of Houthi operations.
While Western partners, seeking to project power and secure shipping lanes, have reportedly discussed launching counter-Houthi operations from Djibouti’s territory, President Guelleh’s administration recoiled. The assessment was stark: allowing direct kinetic action from Djibouti could invite devastating Houthi retaliation, jeopardizing the nation’s hard-won stability and its lucrative position as a secure base-hosting hub.
Facing mounting pressure, particularly from Washington, to contribute more substantively to Red Sea security efforts beyond logistical support, Guelleh appears to have devised a cunning, albeit potentially treacherous, solution: persuade the West to pressure Somalia into shouldering the operational burden. This alleged plan involves convincing Mogadishu to grant access to strategic facilities, specifically the ports of Bosaso and Berbera, as forward operating bases for anti-Houthi missions. This strategic deflection would allow Djibouti to maintain its veneer of non-belligerence while redirecting the inevitable Houthi wrath towards Somalia’s coastline.
Somalia: A Nation Already at War
The notion of Somalia opening a second major war front is, frankly, alarming. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is already deeply engaged in a grinding, existential conflict against the resilient Al-Shabaab insurgency. His recent high-profile visits to frontline districts like Ade, Adan Yabal, and Moqokori were not mere photo opportunities; they were necessary interventions to galvanize demoralized national army units and allied clan militias known as Ma’awisley, which are facing a resurgent Al-Shabaab.
This reality was brutally underscored when HSM himself narrowly survived a complex assassination attempt, reportedly involving significant casualties among his security detail, en route to these very front lines. Al-Shabaab’s demonstrated capacity to exert pressure even near the capital (Bal’as, Afgoi) and expand its influence highlights the fragility of the security situation.
Can a nation struggling with endemic terrorism, chronic political instability, crippling economic hardship, and overstretched security forces realistically absorb the impact of becoming a primary launchpad against a battle-hardened, ideologically driven Houthi movement equipped with ballistic missiles and sophisticated drones?
Is Somalia biting off far more than it can chew, risking strategic overreach that could unravel hard-fought gains against Al-Shabaab? The potential for Houthi retaliatory strikes against Somali coastal communities, ports, and infrastructure looms large, adding a terrifying new dimension of vulnerability for Somali civilians.
Echoes of the Past: A Recurring Vulnerability?
This perilous situation evokes uncomfortable memories. On April 7, 2015, during HSM’s previous presidential term, Somalia acquiesced to a request from the Saudi-led coalition, granting access to its airspace and territory for operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Then-Foreign Minister Abdisalam Omar Hadliye confirmed the decision, ostensibly aligning Somalia with regional allies. Yet, that intervention proved disastrous.
The Saudi coalition became bogged down in a costly quagmire, failing to dislodge the Houthis, while the recognized Yemeni government it backed collapsed into exile. Somalia gained little tangible benefit from its participation, arguably only deepening regional entanglements without advancing its core national interests.
Contrast: The Farmaajo Doctrine of Neutrality
The administration of HSM’s predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, adopted a markedly different posture. When presented with similar overtures, notably from the UAE, urging Somali participation in the Yemen conflict, Villa Somalia firmly declined.
Former Foreign Minister Ahmed Isse Awad articulated this stance with memorable clarity: “Somalia is not a cheap tool to be used to fulfill your demands. Yemen is a neighboring and brotherly country…” This policy extended to maintaining neutrality during the intra-GCC dispute involving Qatar, signaling a desire to shield Somalia from external conflicts and prioritize internal stability and sovereign autonomy.
A Foreign Policy ‘For Rent’?
If Somalia now pivots back towards interventionism under external pressure, it risks reinforcing perceptions of its foreign policy being transactional—a policy effectively “for rent” to the highest bidder or the most insistent power. Such a move could undermine Somalia’s long-term quest for genuine sovereignty and regional respect, portraying it as a pliable pawn in larger geopolitical contests rather than an independent actor pursuing its own defined interests. It begs the question: has Somali leadership learned from the costly lessons of 2015?
The Final Calculus: Navigating the Geopolitical Trap
The Somali government faces immense challenges on multiple fronts. Adding a proxy war against the Houthis—a conflict that regional players like Eritrea have studiously avoided—seems like a reckless gamble with potentially devastating consequences. While Djibouti may feel compelled by Western pressure to shift this burden, the ultimate decision rests with Mogadishu.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud finds himself navigating a complex geopolitical trap. His choice will not only determine Somalia’s immediate security trajectory but could define its foreign policy doctrine and regional standing for years to come. Will he prioritize immediate, perhaps illusory, gains offered by external partners, or will he safeguard Somalia’s fragile stability by refusing entanglement in yet another devastating conflict? The region, and indeed the wider diplomatic world, watches intently.