Introduction
In March 2025, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) invited political rivals, Federal Member State leaders and community representatives to engage in national dialogue. The invitation came at a difficult time, with Al-Shabaab regaining territory, relations between the Federal Government and Puntland and Jubaland deteriorating, and disagreements growing over constitutional and electoral reforms.
Twenty months later, numerous consultations, negotiations and international mediation efforts have taken place. Although some political positions have moved closer, no comprehensive national agreement has been reached. Instead, Somalia faces deeper constitutional disagreements, armed conflict in Southwest State, rising tensions in Hirshabelle and growing geopolitical uncertainty.
The central question is why repeated opportunities for political compromise have coincided with greater political fragmentation.
Twenty Months of Dialogue: What Progress Has Been Made?
March–August 2025: From consultation to negotiation
HSM’s invitation initially received encouraging responses from former national leaders and international partners. However, disagreements quickly emerged over the purpose, participants and expected outcome of the dialogue.
The Federal Government viewed the initiative largely as a consultation process. At the same time, the opposition expected negotiations that could produce a new political agreement and prompt a reconsideration of previous government decisions. This difference between consultation and negotiation became a major obstacle.
In May 2025, the government committee held consultations with civil society and political organisations. However, the process lacked an agreed agenda, clear participation criteria and a decision-making mechanism. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP), bringing together federal and several regional leaders, raised concerns about the government’s commitment to inclusive dialogue.
The subsequent six-week negotiations between HSM and the Somali Salvation Forum collapsed in August 2025, primarily over Chapter Four of the amended Constitution and electoral arrangements. HSM later reached a separate agreement with four prominent opposition figures, but this failed to produce a wider political settlement.
October 2025–March 2026: Competing political processes
The establishment of the Somali Future Council (SFC) in Nairobi in October 2025 brought together Puntland, Jubaland and prominent Mogadishu-based opposition leaders. HSM’s visit to Kismayo in October failed to resolve disagreements with Ahmed Madobe, while the December 2025 Kismayo conference strengthened opposition coordination.
Meanwhile, the Federal Government continued implementing its electoral roadmap, including the Benadir local council elections in December 2025.
The February 2026 negotiations in Mogadishu, involving the presidents of Puntland and Jubaland, presented another significant opportunity. However, disagreements over electoral management, constitutional reforms and the authority of Federal Member States prevented an agreement.
In March 2026, Parliament approved the remaining constitutional amendments. The government presented this as the completion of the constitutional process, while the opposition rejected its legitimacy. Negotiations consequently became harder because political actors no longer operated under an agreed constitutional framework.
May–September 2026: Electoral positions move closer
One of the period’s most important achievements was the gradual convergence of electoral positions. While several opposition leaders had previously favoured expanded indirect elections, direct voting became central to alternative opposition proposals.
Disagreements increasingly focused on political parties versus independent candidates, proportional representation versus constituency-based elections, electoral management bodies, the role of Federal Member States and the electoral timetable.
In August and September 2026, the United States, United Kingdom, Türkiye and European Union, collectively known as the Quartet, supported proposals to establish a Joint Democratic Transition Task Force. This mechanism would allow political leaders to agree on broad principles while technical teams developed detailed electoral arrangements.
Although this represented important procedural progress, the task force was not successfully launched.
October–November 2026: From electoral disagreement to a legitimacy crisis
In October 2026, the electoral commission announced federal parliamentary elections for April 2027 and presidential elections for May 2027.
In November 2026, the disputed Supreme Court ruling concerning constitutional term extensions introduced a new obstacle. The SFC questioned HSM’s legitimacy and demanded that the Quartet convene the dialogue, while the President continued to insist on a Somali-led process.
The proposed November 2026 negotiations failed to materialise despite preliminary meetings between government representatives and three opposition groups.
HSM’s latest willingness to meet opposition leaders at a venue acceptable to them provides another opportunity. However, agreement on a venue alone will not resolve the underlying disagreements.
Regional Elections: Political Progress or Greater Fragmentation?
In March 2025, the principal federal-state disputes concerned Puntland and Jubaland. By November 2026, political disagreements had expanded to Southwest State and Hirshabelle.
Southwest State provides the clearest example of how electoral disagreements can develop into armed conflict. Laftagareen, previously an important political ally of HSM, fell out with the Federal Government over constitutional reforms, regional autonomy and electoral management.
After his disputed re-election in March 2026, federal military intervention removed him from power. Parliamentary elections in May and the election of Sheikh Adan Madobe as Southwest President in June 2026 failed to resolve the political dispute. Armed confrontations subsequently intensified in Baidoa and other parts of Southwest, with Laftagareen-aligned forces challenging the new administration’s authority.
In Hirshabelle, Ali Gudlaawe’s October 2026 re-election intensified longstanding grievances over power-sharing and political representation. Armed mobilisation and the November confrontation involving local forces and AUSSOM personnel in Beledweyne demonstrated how regional political disputes can undermine national and international security efforts.
These two cases demonstrate different consequences of insufficient political consensus: armed conflict in Southwest and community resistance in Hirshabelle.
The government may be winning elections while losing political consensus. Southwest, in particular, should serve as a warning of what could happen if federal elections proceed without broad political agreement.
Why Has the Dialogue Failed?
The government seeks to complete constitutional reforms and introduce direct, party-based elections. The opposition seeks to prevent the government from unilaterally determining the rules of political competition. The failure to balance institutional authority with political consensus has prevented these objectives from becoming complementary.
The Federal Government has continued implementing disputed reforms while negotiating with opponents. From the government’s perspective, suspending implementation could delay democratic reforms indefinitely. From the opposition’s perspective, continued implementation makes negotiations meaningless. Consequently, time has become a political instrument rather than a neutral factor in negotiations.
The opposition remains divided between the SFC, Farmaajo’s group and the group associated with Omar Abdirashid. Within the SFC, Puntland and Jubaland prioritise regional autonomy, while Mogadishu-based politicians focus more on federal electoral competition. These differences weaken their ability to negotiate and implement a common political agreement.
An important paradox has emerged: electoral differences have narrowed, but political mistrust has increased. Many technical disagreements are potentially manageable, but political leaders lack confidence that electoral institutions, security agencies and the judiciary will operate impartially. The problem is increasingly about political guarantees rather than electoral models.
A national agreement involving HSM, Puntland, Jubaland and opposition leaders might have addressed most immediate disputes in March 2025. By November 2026, influential actors from Southwest and Hiiraan had also become essential to a sustainable political settlement. The delay has therefore not merely prolonged the crisis; it has expanded it.
The closure of UNTMIS in October 2026, the Prime Minister’s November remarks about moving beyond the United Nations and C6 Plus, and deteriorating relations with the UAE could complicate international mediation. Meanwhile, uncertainty over AUSSOM financing and international financial assistance increases the security and economic costs of continued political disagreement.
The Way Forward
Somalia needs a structured political settlement process, not another open-ended series of consultations.
Political leaders should establish an agreed agenda, participation criteria, convening mechanism and the role of international facilitators. Participation should not require either side to abandon its constitutional position before negotiations begin.
The government should consider temporarily suspending electoral activities that could prejudge negotiations. Opposition leaders should commit to peaceful political engagement and refrain from establishing parallel electoral processes while negotiations continue. All parties should agree to keep security institutions out of political competition.
Resolving every constitutional disagreement before elections may be unrealistic. A legally supported transitional electoral agreement could allow inclusive elections while leaving longer-term constitutional questions to a broader review process. The objective should be an election that is both feasible and politically accepted.
Political leaders should resolve fundamental disagreements and authorise technical teams to develop implementing arrangements. Technical committees should not be expected to resolve issues that require political concessions.
An urgent de-escalation process is needed in Southwest, involving the government, regional administration, Laftagareen’s representatives and influential community leaders. Separate reconciliation processes should address Hiiraan’s grievances. These initiatives should proceed alongside national negotiations rather than depend entirely on them.
The Quartet should continue supporting a Somali-owned process, encouraging reciprocal concessions and realistic electoral timelines. International partners should also help prevent domestic political disagreements from becoming part of wider geopolitical rivalries.
Finally, any political agreement should contain clear implementation responsibilities, timelines, monitoring arrangements and mechanisms for resolving subsequent disputes.
Conclusion: Somalia Has an Agreement Deficit, Not a Dialogue Deficit
Twenty months after HSM’s invitation, Somalia’s experience demonstrates that political meetings do not necessarily produce political settlements.
Somalia has made meaningful progress in developing alternative electoral models, narrowing differences over direct elections, and establishing potential negotiation mechanisms. However, these achievements have been undermined by unilateral decisions, opposition fragmentation, regional conflicts and declining institutional trust.
The armed conflict in Southwest provides the strongest warning of the consequences of conducting elections without sufficient political consensus. Establishing a new administration does not necessarily resolve competing claims to political legitimacy.
The cost of failing to reach an agreement is now considerably higher than it was in March 2025. Somalia must address constitutional disputes, regional conflicts, financial uncertainty and geopolitical tensions while continuing its fight against Al-Shabaab.
HSM’s renewed invitation should therefore be assessed not by the number of politicians who attend or the meetings that take place, but by whether it produces credible, reciprocal and enforceable political commitments.
BY: Mohamed Mukhtar Ibrahim

