Somalia’s Third Republic was established as a federal country because no durable national government could be rebuilt through domination by the center. Federalism was intended to distribute power, accommodate regional interests and hold together a country fractured by decades of conflict. Today, that political settlement is under serious strain. Disputes over the Constitution, the electoral model and the division of authority have pushed the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), several Federal Member States (FMS) and opposition groups toward confrontation. In Southwest State, that confrontation has become military.
In this piece, I examine how disputes over federalism, constitutional amendments, the president’s expired mandate and the electoral process have brought Somalia to this point. I argue that the crisis cannot be resolved through unilateral decisions or force; it requires an inclusive political settlement that restores trust and keeps the national army out of partisan conflict.
Puntland and Jubaland have rejected the federal government’s constitutional process, while other political actors accuse Villa Somalia of weakening the autonomy of the FMS and concentrating power in Mogadishu. The FGS argues that direct elections and stronger national institutions are necessary to move Somalia beyond repeated elite bargaining. That objective has merit. But a democratic system cannot gain legitimacy when one side determines the rules and imposes them on the rest of the country. The FGS’s approach toward the member states has therefore been interpreted as an attempt to dismantle federalism rather than reform it.
The president points to voting conducted in parts of Southwest State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle as evidence that Somalia is advancing toward one-person, one-vote elections. Yet these processes were widely regarded by Somalis as selections rather than genuine elections. Political competition was restricted, outcomes were heavily managed, and voters were not offered a meaningful choice. Despite this, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has presented them as victories for democratization. Democracy cannot be measured by the opening of polling stations alone; it requires genuine competition, institutional independence and public confidence in the result.
The electoral timetable has intensified the dispute as well. The president’s electoral commission has announced parliamentary elections for April 15, 2027, followed by a presidential election on May 15. Opposition groups reject the timetable because it was announced without agreement on the electoral framework, administration of the vote or constitutional basis for extending the current political arrangement. Much of the opposition supports direct elections in principle but disputes a process controlled by Villa Somalia.
The unilateral timetable has also fueled rumors that the president intends to proceed with an election on his own terms, declare himself the winner and remain in office even if his authority is reduced to Villa Somalia. Whether or not this is his plan, the fact that such fears are circulating reflects the depth of mistrust and makes an agreed political process more urgent.
That disagreement is also tied directly to the president’s mandate. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s four-year term expired on May 15, 2026. In January 2024, he publicly assured Somalis that constitutional changes, particularly any change affecting the presidential term, would apply to the next legislative term, not the current one. Two months later, amendments were approved changing the terms of federal institutions from four to five years. The president now relies on those amendments to justify remaining in office until May 2027.
His current position contradicts his earlier assurance. The opposition maintains that the amendments cannot be applied retroactively to extend a mandate obtained under the previous four-year arrangement. The president’s decision to proceed under the amended electoral model, including changes to how national leaders are elected, has deepened the constitutional crisis and damaged trust.
The president is expected to uphold the Constitution and serve as a symbol of national unity, especially during a political crisis. His responsibility is to keep the country together while addressing competing national interests. When he becomes a party to the dispute rather than a credible mediator, the presidency loses its unifying role.
The proposed consultative forum in Mogadishu from November 14 to 18 has not restored confidence. The invitation alone is insufficient, particularly after repeated failures to negotiate with opposition groups, even following international efforts to resolve the electoral disagreement. Many stakeholders suspect the invitation is intended to buy time rather than produce an agreement.
That mistrust is reinforced by Villa Somalia’s failure to offer a clear agenda, agreed ground rules or a mutually accepted process for the dialogue. It has not explained how participants would shape the agenda or influence decisions already announced. Unless opposition concerns are addressed, the forum may not take place in any meaningful form. A meeting controlled entirely by the presidency would amount to political management, not negotiation.
The political standoff is also playing out on the ground in Southwest State. In March, federal forces entered Baidoa, removed the administration of President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and supported a replacement authority. Armed confrontation has continued, with forces loyal to Laftagareen regaining several district centers and putting pressure on routes leading to Baidoa. The use of federal forces in this struggle has turned a political dispute into an internal armed conflict.
That conflict is also diverting the Somali National Army from the national security role it is expected to assume as African Union forces draw down. The SNA is not ready to replace those forces across the country; some areas transferred to Somali forces have since returned to Al-Shabaab control. Using the army against domestic political opponents further weakens its ability to secure the country and undermines public confidence in its national mission. It also damages public confidence and creates opportunities for Al-Shabaab to expand.
The continuing confrontation in Southwest State and the diversion of the SNA into internal political conflict make a negotiated settlement urgent. The immediate priority should be to de-escalate the fighting and keep the army out of partisan disputes. The president, FMS leaders and opposition groups should then enter negotiations under a process with a jointly agreed agenda and ground rules, with facilitation acceptable to all parties. Talks must address the disputed constitutional amendments, the president’s mandate and the electoral timetable, and produce a roadmap that all sides agree to respect. Without such an agreement, competing electoral processes, rival claims to legitimacy and further armed confrontation remain real risks.
The central test is whether President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will accept a negotiated electoral settlement that the federal member states and opposition can trust. Somalia’s political future depends on that choice.
By Dr. Ali Said Faqi
