The political confrontation that has divided Somalia’s Federal Government and South-West State has entered a new and more dangerous phase, with fighting in and around Baidoa bringing rival political claims, competing security forces and allegations of Al-Shabaab cooperation into the same battlefield.
The city at the centre of the dispute
Baidoa is the administrative capital of South-West State and one of Somalia’s principal political and security centres. Its strategic importance has increased because it also hosts a large population displaced by Somalia’s wider conflicts and humanitarian crises.
Control of the city provides access to the institutions of South-West State and its security infrastructure.
That makes the contest over Baidoa inseparable from the contest over the regional presidency.
Federal troops currently provide the principal military force defending the city against Laftagareen-aligned fighters.
Madobe’s administration operates within that federal-backed security environment.
Laftagareen’s political camp remains outside the formal administration but continues to challenge its legitimacy.
The escalation has also drawn the African Union deeper into the dispute.
An African Union Commission memorandum dated 21 August 2026 authorises the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia, AUSSOM, to join Somali government forces in military operations against Al-Shabaab and affiliated armed groups in South-West State.
The decision followed a request from the Federal Government of Somalia over the deteriorating security situation in Baidoa.
But the same African Union instruction requires AUSSOM to remain politically neutral and impartial and to avoid involvement in Somalia’s internal political fighting.
That distinction is now at the centre of the crisis.
The Federal Government says forces loyal to former South-West president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen attacked Somali National Army positions alongside Al-Shabaab fighters.
Laftagareen’s camp rejects the allegation and says the forces involved were South-West State Darawish personnel responding to attacks by federal troops.
The competing accounts have turned Baidoa into a test of whether Somalia’s counter-insurgency campaign can remain separate from its increasingly bitter political struggle.
The March confrontation
The present crisis began with a political dispute that escalated into a military confrontation in March.
Laftagareen, who had led South-West State since 2018, challenged the Federal Government over the state’s political process and maintained that he had been legitimately re-elected on 28 March 2026. Mogadishu rejected the process.
Federal forces moved into Baidoa on 30 March, taking control of the regional capital after a confrontation with forces aligned with Laftagareen.
Laftagareen subsequently stepped down, but his political position did not disappear with his departure from the city.
He has continued to maintain that the March election gave him a legitimate mandate and that his administration was removed through federal military intervention.
Contemporary reporting described intense negotiations around his departure, with Ethiopia and the African Union involved in efforts surrounding the political transition.
The federal authorities moved to establish a transitional administration in Baidoa.
The result was an unresolved political divide rather than a settled transfer of power.
On 10 June, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, who previously served as Speaker of Somalia’s House of the People, was elected President of South-West State in Baidoa. He secured 88 votes out of 90, with his only challenger receiving one vote and one ballot declared invalid. Madobe’s election was supported by the Federal Government.
On 6 July, Madobe was inaugurated in Baidoa in a ceremony attended by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre and other senior Federal Government officials. The ceremony established a new political authority in the regional capital.
Laftagareen’s camp, however, did not recognise the transition.
The result was a contest between two political claims: Madobe’s June election and Laftagareen’s continuing assertion that his March mandate remained legitimate.
The political balance shifted again in August. On 10 August, Somalia’s House of the People elected Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, known as Jama, as its new Speaker.
Nur received 142 votes against 30 for his challenger, replacing Madobe, who had held the speakership before becoming South-West State president.
Madobe therefore lost one of the most influential positions in Somalia’s federal political system only weeks after assuming the South-West presidency.
The change altered his position in the wider political contest surrounding Baidoa.
He remained president of South-West State, but no longer occupied the parliamentary office that had given him a direct institutional role in Mogadishu.
On 7 August, Laftagareen publicly rejected the Federal Government’s political process in Mogadishu. He said South-West State was not participating in what he described as “illegal elections” being organised by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration and said his camp would not recognise representatives emerging from that process. The statement extended the dispute beyond the South-West presidency.
Laftagareen’s camp was now challenging the broader political process being pursued by Mogadishu.
The language reflected a wider disagreement over the relationship between Somalia’s Federal Government and its Federal Member States, with South-West State presenting itself as defending its political authority against federal intervention.
Mediation behind the scenes
While the public rhetoric hardened, mediation efforts were also taking place.
According to information reported exclusively by Somali Stream, efforts were made to mediate between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Laftagareen camp as tensions increased.
The discussions took place against the backdrop of competing political claims and growing military deployments around Baidoa. The reported mediation efforts did not prevent the confrontation that followed.
By mid-August, the dispute had moved from political statements and negotiations back to armed confrontation.
At approximately 5am on 17 August, fighting broke out in Baidoa. Somali federal troops clashed with forces loyal to Laftagareen.
The city is home to hundreds of thousands of people, including large numbers of displaced Somalis who have fled conflict and hunger elsewhere in the country.
Somalia’s Ministry of Defence said Somali National Army positions had been attacked by militias comprising Al-Shabaab members and forces loyal to Laftagareen. The ministry said the attackers used vehicles loaded with explosives. It reported that almost 30 members of the attacking force were killed, several were captured and weapons and vehicles were seized. The casualty figures have been disputed.
Laftagareen disputes the identity of the attackers
His administration rejects the Federal Government’s description of its forces as Al-Shabaab-linked militias.
In a statement issued on 27 August, the South-West State administration said its Darawish Forces were lawfully established security forces responsible for protecting civilians, public institutions and the constitutional order of the state. It rejected the description of those forces as “militias affiliated with Al-Shabaab”.
Laftagareen has also said the recent attacks were conducted by Darawish forces rather than Al-Shabaab.
According to his account, the attacks were responses to confrontations initiated by Somali government forces.
Mogadishu describes an attack against national military positions involving Al-Shabaab and armed groups loyal to a former regional leader. Laftagareen describes armed South-West forces responding to federal military pressure. Laftagareen has also issued a direct warning about his forces’ capacity to escalate the fighting.
He has said that his forces have the capability to launch further attacks in Baidoa but that he has chosen not to unleash them because of the potential consequences for civilians.
The former president has repeatedly pointed to his administration’s record of maintaining security in Baidoa. “We have been protecting Baidoa for eight years,” he said.
His position is that the Darawish Forces should be treated as regional security personnel rather than terrorist fighters.
The Federal Government’s allegation of cooperation between Laftagareen-aligned forces and Al-Shabaab is the most consequential element of the dispute. The government has presented the 17 August assault as part of a wider security threat to Baidoa.
South-West State disputes that assessment.
The African Union’s own language reflects the seriousness of the allegation. Its 21 August memorandum describes concern over an emerging alliance between local armed militias and Al-Shabaab and refers to coordinated attacks against Somali military formations in and around Baidoa.
The memorandum authorises AUSSOM to join the Federal Government in military operations against Al-Shabaab and affiliated militias or armed entities.
But it simultaneously directs AUSSOM to maintain political neutrality and impartiality and to avoid involvement in political fighting.
The dispute has now moved directly into AUSSOM’s operational space.
The mission was established to support Somalia’s security institutions, protect civilians and assist in the fight against Al-Shabaab.
Its mandate does not, however, extend to settling Somalia’s political disputes.
The African Union has explicitly instructed the mission to avoid political fighting.
Laftagraeen has seized on that provision.
In its 27 August statement, the administration called on the African Union and AUSSOM to independently verify the facts before supporting or participating in military operations.
It also warned against operations that could result in bombardment, displacement or civilian casualties in Baidoa and surrounding areas.
Three political facts now define the confrontation
The first is that Laftagareen has not accepted the political transition that followed his removal from Baidoa.
The second is that Madobe’s administration has been recognised and supported by the Federal Government, but Madobe has since lost his position as Speaker of the national parliament.
The third is that the political confrontation has now acquired an armed dimension, with the two sides giving fundamentally different accounts of the forces involved.
These developments have transformed what was initially a dispute over elections and political legitimacy into a security confrontation in which military control of Baidoa has become central.
The latest position
AUSSOM has now been authorised to support federal operations against Al-Shabaab and affiliated armed entities, while being instructed to remain politically neutral. The result is an increasingly narrow distinction between the political and military dimensions of the Baidoa crisis.
For the Federal Government, the confrontation is taking place in the context of national security and the fight against Al-Shabaab. For Laftagareen’s camp, it is a struggle over political authority and the defence of South-West State’s security forces.
For the African Union, the distinction has become operational.
And in Baidoa, where federal troops and Laftagareen-aligned forces have already fought for control of the city, the political dispute has entered its most militarised phase since the confrontation began in March.
The security picture in Baidoa appears to have deteriorated further in recent days, with footage circulating from the city showing an unusually large armed convoy escorting South-West State President Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe on his way to work.
More than ten vehicles, accompanied by dozens of heavily armed security personnel, were seen moving with the president through the city in a conspicuous display of force.The scale of the protection detail offers a stark indication of the security environment facing the newly installed administration.
Madobe, who only weeks ago was presented by Mogadishu as the political answer to South-West State’s prolonged leadership crisis, is now moving through the regional capital under a level of armed protection normally associated with a leader facing an immediate and credible security threat.The president is in Baidoa, but the streets around him remain heavily militarised.
Local ministers serving in the South-West State administration have also been seen travelling in AUSSOM armoured personnel carriers rather than their official government vehicles. Video footage showed ministers disembarking from the armoured vehicles after being transported through the city.
The use of AUSSOM armoured carriers to move civilian political officials provides another indication of the extent to which the security situation has begun to shape the daily functioning of the regional government.
Government officials who would ordinarily move through Baidoa in civilian or official vehicles are instead being transported inside armoured military platforms.
An administration caught between two armed threats
Madobe’s government is now operating in an increasingly difficult security environment, caught between the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the continuing confrontation with forces aligned with former president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen.
The two threats are being described very differently by the opposing sides.
The Federal Government has accused Al-Shabaab and forces loyal to Laftagareen of participating in attacks against Somali National Army positions in and around Baidoa.
Laftagareen’s camp rejects the allegation that its Darawish Forces are affiliated with Al-Shabaab and maintains that its armed personnel are legitimate South-West State security forces.
The result is a security environment in which the administration must contend simultaneously with an established Islamist insurgency and a rival armed network whose political leadership continues to challenge the legitimacy of the government in Baidoa.
The presence of AUSSOM armoured vehicles around government ministers brings that convergence into sharp relief.
The regional administration is not simply being protected by its own security structures. It is increasingly operating within a security architecture dominated by Somali federal forces and African Union troops.
Laftagareen claims the administration has lost control
Laftagareen has sought to portray the heavy security presence around Madobe and his ministers as evidence of the administration’s diminishing authority. He has argued that the current South-West administration has lost effective military and political control across the wider state, despite retaining the formal institutions of government in Baidoa.
His argument is that control of a government compound or the regional capital is not equivalent to control of the territory governed by South-West State.
Baidoa may be under the protection of federal and AUSSOM forces, but the broader question of who exercises authority across South-West State remains contested.
Laftagareen’s camp continues to claim political legitimacy and maintains influence through its networks and armed personnel, while Madobe’s administration relies heavily on the Federal Government-backed security presence in and around the capital.