By Abdiqani Hamud Abokor
For over two decades, the Gedo region in southern Somalia has been a volatile crucible of armed conflict, civil strife, political disputes, and escalating strategic rivalries following the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991. It has become the central stage for an unending political tug-of-war and a pressure point exploited by successive Somali and foreign governments to assert or consolidate power.
The Stages of Gedo’s Conflict
1. Clan Conflict and Civil Strife (1991–1995)
Following the fall of President Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime, clan-based militias emerged in Gedo. The Somali National Front (SNF), led by Omar Haji Masale and Mohamed Hashi Gani, both former high-ranking Generals in the Somali National Army, held sway over the region.
Tensions grew among local clans, each aiming to control the entire Gedo region. Across all districts, members of the Sade clan, the largest in the region, were principal participants in this political contest.
Capitalizing on rivalries between warlords and remnants of the military regime, the Islamist movement Al-Itihad quickly took control of the region. They began by establishing an administrative structure and raising armed units. Simultaneously, they built networks both inside Somalia and abroad, laying the groundwork for Al-Itihad’s expansion within the province.
2. The Start of Foreign Intervention (1996-2005)
In 1996, Ethiopia intervened militarily to support a faction within the SNF in its fight against Al-Itihad Al-Islami, a religious faction that had governed the cities of Beled Hawo, Doolow, and Luuq between 1991 and 1996. The SNF retained political and military dominance in Gedo until the formation of Somalia’s Transitional National Government in 2000 under the Arta reconciliation process.
From that period onward, effective power in the region was informally held by various SNF commanders who extended their control from Kismayo to Bardhere. Notable figures included former Somali Defense Ministers Barre Adan Shire “Hiiraale” and Abdirisak Isak Bihi, as well as the current Internal Security Minister Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail “Fartaag.” They maintained political influence in the region until the formal establishment of the Jubaland administration under Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe.”
3. The Rise of the Islamic Courts and Ethiopia’s Invasion (2006–2013)
The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its rapid spread into southern regions prompted Ethiopia’s formal military intervention in 2006. Ethiopian troops crossed the border to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Baidoa, which felt threatened by the ICU’s advance.
Ethiopia’s influence deepened as it forged strong ties with local politicians, including Abdirashid Hassan Abdinuur “Janan,” who became one of Addis Ababa’s point men and the de facto administrator of much of the region, including the strategic Daawo triangle (the Beled-Hawo, Doolow, and Luuq trifecta).
4. Jubaland Formation and Political Turbulence (2013–2019)
The establishment of the Jubaland administration in 2013 sparked political rifts between Gedo residents and the new regional leadership. Ethiopia consistently sided with actors aligned with its interests. Gedo once again became the epicenter of a politically engineered conflict shaped by shifting alliances among state and non-state actors.
Disputes between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ahmed Madobe (2012–2014) granted Ethiopia a new role as mediator. Although a settlement between Mogadishu and Kismayo was eventually reached, Gedo residents were excluded from the process—laying the foundation for tensions that would later draw in both Egypt and Ethiopia’s broader geopolitical rivalry.
5. Standoff Between Kismayo and Mogadishu:
Farmaajo vs. Madobe
The 2019 ‘re-election’ of Ahmed Madobe, unilaterally held in a self-serving coronation, reignited tensions between Jubaland and the Federal Government, making Gedo once again ground zero for a power struggle that escalated into open armed conflict. The fighting, especially around Beled Hawo, came to embody the political feud between President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe).
During Farmaajo’s term (2017–2022), the Federal Government asserted control over much of Gedo using a combination of local support and Ethiopian military backing. Federally aligned forces, directly funded and commanded from Mogadishu, maintained dominance over key towns, dislodging Madobe and allied Jubaland forces from the region.
Return of Hassan Sheikh and the Resurgence of Conflict
When President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud returned to power in May 2022, a period of détente emerged between the Federal Government and Ahmed Madobe’s Jubaland administration. Federal troops withdrew from Gedo, and administrative authority was ceded to Kismayo once again.
However, following Madobe’s subsequent ‘re-election’ in late 2024, tensions reignited. Villa Somalia deployed troops to Gedo, sparking renewed clashes. This time, Ethiopia re-entered the conflict, not as an indirect player but as an active combatant—directly opposing Somali government forces on every front.
In July 2025, Somali forces led by Abdirashid Janan fought troops loyal to Jubaland Vice President Mahamud Sayid Aden in Beled Hawo. After several days of combat, Jubaland forces were ousted from the town. Telecommunications and electricity were cut off, and thousands were displaced.
The conflict spread to Doolow, a strategically significant town, where Somali federal troops were attacked by Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopian military bombed the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) mobile armory while the Somali president and NISA director were both physically present in Addis Ababa. Two direct Ethiopian offensives in Doolow forced the Somali military out, and their commander subsequently evacuated to Mogadishu.
Gedo: Ethiopia’s ‘Buffer’
Since Somalia’s state collapse in 1991, Ethiopia has regarded Gedo as a non-negotiable zone of influence—a geopolitical buffer it consistently intervenes in, both overtly and covertly.
Whether under the pretext of fighting Islamist threats, maintaining border security, or contributing to AMISOM missions, Ethiopian troops have entered Gedo in 1996, 2006, and 2011. Each time, Ethiopia justified its actions as efforts to stabilize Somalia. Today, however, Ethiopia’s ambitions appear to have extended beyond border security. Gedo is no longer just critical to Ethiopia’s security but has become a central part of its sphere of influence.
Recent clashes have increasingly revealed a more aggressive Ethiopian posture, exposing a previously covert policy now unfolding openly.
The New Front: Gedo and the Ethiopia–Egypt Conundrum
Ethiopia’s controversial maritime deal with Somaliland in January 2024 enraged the Somali government, which responded with a diplomatic offensive. Somalia reached out to Egypt for strategic and military support, deepening ties with Cairo and forming a full-fledged defense alliance.
Somalia invited Egypt to contribute troops to the African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS), a proposal Egypt reportedly accepted. Ahead of the Ankara talks, reports surfaced about deploying Egyptian troops along Ethiopia’s border, triggering alarm in Addis Ababa.
Already locked in a bitter dispute with Egypt over the Nile River, Ethiopia viewed Somalia’s outreach as an extension of its geopolitical rivalry with Cairo—and shifted the battleground to Somali territory. Consequently, Gedo emerged as the new frontline.
Collapse of the Ankara Declaration
A Turkish-brokered deal in December 2024 aimed at de-escalating the Somalia–Ethiopia conflict ultimately failed. Despite initial optimism, the agreement fizzled without implementation. Ethiopia reportedly withdrew unilaterally, though neither side provided official confirmation.
As talks faltered, Ethiopia proposed that technical committees meet in Addis Ababa; such meetings took place in mid-July. However, these gestures exposed the limitations of Somali diplomacy, which appeared to lack staying power and a coherent long-term strategy.
BBC reports suggest Turkey neither confirmed nor denied the deal’s collapse, further clouding its fate.
Egypt’s Quandary
Despite promising military aid, training, and logistical support, Egypt has yet to take concrete action. Somalia now finds itself isolated in a strategic showdown led by Ethiopia.
Cairo’s silence is being interpreted as an abandonment of Somalia, which faces a deepening crisis—especially as Ethiopian troops have ordered Somali forces to vacate parts of their sovereign territory.
When Will Somali Government Break Its Silence?
Since Ethiopia unveiled its plan to access Somali waters in 2024, Somalia has maintained a cautious tone. Although it initially showed assertiveness, it has failed to secure a decisive victory or deter Ethiopian ambitions.
The Somali government is now under pressure to abandon its passive stance and take a firmer position. In the past two weeks alone, Ethiopia has launched attacks, seized Doolow, demanded the withdrawal of Somali forces from Gedo, and engaged directly with Jubaland authorities and clan elders.
Moreover, Somalia must resolve its internal political divisions and present a unified national strategy to counter external aggression—lest the country fracture from within, with some factions enabling Ethiopia’s encroachment.
Note: This article was originally published in our Somali language section and has been translated for our English readers.