From Fanfare to Silence: Somalia’s Nonexistent Role in the EAC

On 24^th November 2023, the Heads of State of the East African Community admitted the Federal Republic of Somalia into the bloc, making it the EAC’s eighth partner state. After completing its ratification procedures, Somalia was formally declared a full member on 4^th March 2024. In public pronouncements, both the Somali government and EAC officials celebrated what was cast as a historic win: expanded trade space, regional integration, and an added new political weight.

Yet, as of mid-2025, the much-anticipated consequences of membership—influence, representation, institutional participation—have not materialized in any meaningful way. Somalia has not seated its MPs in the EAC Legislative Assembly; its nominated minister and judge remain unsworn; key integration steps such as legal harmonization, institutional alignment or active engagement in EAC organs appear stalled. Even references to Somalia in EAC deliberations are rare or muted. In many respects, Somalia’s membership remains just a hollow act of history.

How did this come about?

1. One Year of Lost Opportunities

Somalia’s eager accession in late 2023 and formal membership in March 2024 offered exactly that window. But rather than rushing to take its seat at the table, Somalia has lingered outside. While the EAC Secretariat and organs have (without fail) continually proceeded with policy, budgets, and programs for the member states that are active, Somalia sits on the sidelines—observed, but not heard.

This absence has multiple cascading real-time costs:

• Loss of agenda-setting power: By not being part of ministerial councils, committees, or legislative deliberations, Somalia forgoes any role in shaping the EAC’s evolving legislation, priorities, or regional projects.
• Missed early integration synergies: Roads, railways, energy or ICT network plans, trade linkages, cross-border infrastructure—all of which are at their formative stages—will be drawn now largely without Somalia’s voice or input.
• Credibility deficits: External actors (donors, foreign governments, investors) may interpret Somalia’s lack of action as lack of seriousness or internal dysfunction, undermining confidence.

2. Costly Investment With No Return

Membership is not symbolic; it is transactional. Somalia understood that—and backed it with a serious financial commitment for a country with a fragile economy. Somalia paid the first quarter installment of its membership dues—US$3.5 million, representing roughly 50% of the total due. Yet, this contribution has yielded no representation, no delegated MPs, and no formal voice in the EAC’s legislative processes. That is a deeply inequitable outcome as its “investment” remains a sunk cost. One might even call such a case “revenue without representation.”

3. Blocked Representation Due to Neglect (Not Procedure)

At the heart of Somalia’s absence is a procedural bottleneck: the EAC protocol demands that national MPs be seated first before ministerial nominees or judges can be sworn into EAC organs. Thus, Somalia nominated a Minister for East African Affairs and its judge, but they remain uninstalled because the nine MPs have not been appointed and sent to Arusha.

This is not an external barrier; it is a domestic failure. The Speaker of the Somali Parliament, Adan Madoobe, has failed to prioritize the nomination of these MPs. The government has thus neglected a binding requirement of the accession protocol.

4. Geopolitical Risks of Delay

Somalia’s decision to join the EAC was not wholly about trade and economic integration only, It was a strategic move in regional positioning, sovereignty, and multilateral leverage. In the Horn of Africa, where great-power interests, border tensions, and internal fragmentation are an omnipresent reality, membership in a bloc like the EAC was supposed to be a form of geopolitical insurance.

By failing to act on its membership as it has shown, Somalia has granted outside influences wiggle room over the regional destiny. Countries that seek to weaken Somalia’s regional standing—whether through diplomatic pressure, back-channel influence, or lobby groups—see in this inaction a fertile opening.

There is direct evidence of such interference: in Tanzania, for example, a seminar was planned to question Somalia’s EAC membership legitimacy—reportedly by lobby groups such as Sahan Consultancy backed by foreign interests. Tanzanian authorities eventually blocked the event, but its very planning suggests that Somalia’s lag is being exploited. This is no trivial matter—if external actors can drive public skepticism in EAC capitals, Somalia’s membership becomes contested and delegitimized.

Moreover, Somalia has previously demonstrated an ability to leverage other multilateral bodies like the African Union, the Arab League, the Organizaton of Islamic Countries (OIC)—to protect its sovereignty. For example, in the case of Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU crisis, Somalia has mobilized regional and global bodies to push back on encroachments on its territorial integrity. By failing to embed itself in the EAC, Somalia weakens one of its multilateral bulwarks.

In short: this delay is not just embarrassing—it is dangerous. It allows external actors to shape narratives and frameworks around Somalia’s regional integration without its input. Unless Somalia locks down its deserved seat, others will continue to carve space into which it cannot meaningfully intrude.

5. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Political Legacy at Risk

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has staked part of his second stint’s political identity on three signature achievements: attaining debt relief, securing the lifting of the long-standing UN arms embargo, and winning Somalia’s admission to the EAC bloc. His administration touted all three ‘achievements’ publicly and each one carries its own significant symbolism.

Principally, the EAC achievement now risks becoming a poisoned chalice. If the membership is not fully operationalized—if Somalia does not participate in all EAC organs, vote on budgets, send MPs to EALA, or reap the institutional benefits—the “achievement” will look meaningless. In political terms, it could be recast by his critics as mere vanity devoid of substance.

Worse, the EAC “victory” may unravel from within, becoming an embarrassment: a gigantic hyperbole undone by domestic failure. Observers and political scientists will ask, “You achieved admission—but you couldn’t even seat your MPs?” That would make the EAC accession a footnote of political incompetence rather than a legacy.

6. The Last Chance Window

Time is not on Somalia’s side. The upcoming EAC session (scheduled to open at end of September in Arusha and run through November) reportedly offers the final opportunity to seat the Somali representatives. Should Somalia once again fail, its membership risks being revisited or downgraded.

At the same time, Somalia’s own parliamentary calendar is under stress: the current legislature is nearing the end of its sessions, ahead of national elections. The window to nominate and confirm nine EAC MPs collapses in time with internal deadlines. Any more delays beyond this juncture will make rectification legally and politically more fraught.

This alignment of external (EAC schedule) and internal (parliamentary cycle) deadlines constitutes a final chance. If Somalia fails now, it may forever lose its moment to fully institutionalize its membership.

7. Urgent Call for Leadership

The explanations so far converge to a simple truth: the delay is not technical—it is political. It is not constitutional—it is discretionary. It is not external—it is internal.

The Speaker of Parliament, Adan Madoobe, and other national leaders must treat the seating of Somali EAC MPs as a priority. Each month of inaction weakens Somalia’s standing in the EAC, wastes scarce financial resources, undermines the President’s political record, and hands ammunition to critics both internally and externally.

In more granular terms, the leadership must:

1. Immediately nominate the nine MPswho will enter the EAC Legislative Assembly, fulfilling the protocol that unlocks further appointments.
2. Ensure parliamentary coordination and securityto allow the process to proceed free of chaos or interference—parliamentary fights or media suppression must not derail this urgent task.
3. Mobilize domestic buy-inacross parties, sub-federal governments, clans, and civil society to treat EAC integration as a national—not partisan—priority.
4. Publicly track and demand progress: the people deserve transparency in who is nominated, when they are sworn in, and how the EAC process unfolds.
5. Leverage diplomacy: inform EAC Secretariat and partner states that Somalia is committed and expects reciprocal flexibility in the early sessions, to prevent its voice from being sidelined by delay.

Conclusion

The way forward is neither complex nor optional. Somalia must urgently seat its representatives, claim its rightful place in the EAC and constituent institutions. This is not simply about regional diplomacy—it is about a national strategy and political relevance. Failure to act decisively will not only waste a historic opportunity but could permanently diminish Somalia’s role in the region.