Mustafa Osman Farah
On July 27, 2025, Al-Shabaab militants launched a carefully planned attack on Mahaas, a key town in central Hiiraan. The assault began with multiple suicide bombers detonating explosives on the outskirts, creating shock and chaos. This was quickly followed by heavy gunfire as the militants advanced into the town. The speed and coordination of the attack showed the group’s increasing capability to conduct complex operations in contested areas.
However, despite the ferocity of the attack, the town fell with almost no resistance. Somali army units and allied local militias known as the Ma’awisley had withdrawn just before the militants entered. This withdrawal was not the result of a decisive military defeat on the battlefield, but rather a symptom of deeper problems. The defense forces were poorly supplied, lacked reinforcements, and suffered from low morale. The loss of a senior National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) officer during the attack highlighted the risks government forces still faced even as they retreated.
The fall of Mahaas was part of a broader offensive that saw Al-Shabab also capture the towns of Moqokori and Tardo earlier in July. These towns are strategically important, sitting on vital roads that link the Bulobarde area of Hiiraan with Jalalaqsi. Their capture severed the government’s main supply corridor to the north, disrupting the movement of troops, weapons, and supplies. The isolation of villages around these towns has had a serious impact on local communities, cutting them off from aid and security.
Local officials repeatedly requested reinforcements and air support during this period, but these calls went unanswered. There was a troubling silence from the Federal Government and regional authorities. The absence of timely support was a critical factor in the rapid collapse of defenses in these areas. Without backup, local fighters were left to fend for themselves against a better-organized enemy.
The Ma’awisley militias have long been a key part of the local defense strategy in Hiiraan. These are clan-based volunteer fighters, often farmers, elders, and civilians who took up arms to defend their communities. Despite lacking formal military training, uniforms, or steady pay, they proved their commitment by pushing Al-Shabaab out of dozens of villages during 2022 and early 2023. They frequently held ground that the regular army could not due to limited reach and resources. Their dedication and local knowledge made them invaluable defenders.
By early 2025, the Somali government publicly praised the Ma’awisley fighters and announced plans to integrate them formally into the national army. This was welcomed by many as a step towards recognizing their sacrifice and improving local security. However, the reality on the ground was very different. Promises of weapons, ammunition, salaries, and fuel were not fulfilled. Many of the militias found themselves without the means to continue fighting.
By mid-2024, a significant number had drifted away, disillusioned and unsupported. This erosion of local defense capacity left a security vacuum that militants quickly exploited.
In mid-July 2025, the situation deteriorated further as Al-Shabaab militants began massing near El Baraf, on the border of Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle. Ma’awisley units rushed to fortify the main road out of Jalalaqsi, establishing checkpoints at Qoryaale and Halfoley villages. Their aim was to slow the militant advance and protect their communities. Despite their efforts, no federal troops or air cover arrived to reinforce these positions. When the militants struck Moqokori and Tardo again, the local defenders found themselves trapped with no fallback options. They were forced to retreat to save lives, and soon thereafter, Mahaas fell, ending the last significant resistance pocket in the region.
The collapse of Hiiraan’s defenses cannot be understood without recognizing the role of Somalia’s political environment. Analysts attribute the slowdown in counteroffensive operations largely to national and regional political tensions. Instead of rallying behind their own militias and frontline fighters, federal and Hirshabelle leaders became entangled in bitter disputes. Clans such as the Hawadle and Murusade traded accusations and blame for the security failures, further fracturing an already fragile command structure. Unity vanished as political rivalries deepened. The result was a state fighting itself while militants advanced.
A similar pattern unfolded in the Gedo region. The Federal Government appointed Abdirashid Hassan Abdinur (Janan) as the new intelligence chief in Gedo, the move sparked immediate conflict., Jubaland forces clashed with federal troops, resulting in at least five soldiers killed and the loss of the district headquarters to Jubaland control. This showdown revealed the intense and ongoing feud between the Federal Government and Jubaland authorities. These internal conflicts have weakened Somalia’s overall capacity to fight Al-Shabaab, as key regions become battlegrounds for political power struggles rather than counterterrorism operations.
This internal rift further underscored the fragility of Somalia’s security apparatus, where political rivalries frequently override unified counterterrorism efforts. The effects have rippled through civilian populations: in Belet Hawo district, conflict since 22 July has affected over 38,000 people. Of these, 28,000 have been displaced locally, while another 10,200 have sought refuge across the border in Mandera, Kenya.
The ongoing instability has severely disrupted local economies and access to basic needs. In Belet Hawo, where the FAO’s FSNAU estimates nearly 25% of the population is in either crisis or emergency food insecurity, violence has choked off trade, closed businesses, and caused a sharp drop in humanitarian access. In Doolow, the suspension of commercial flights since mid-July has delayed the delivery of food, medical supplies, and humanitarian personnel. Market access remains precarious, and widespread livestock losses have stripped families of their primary sources of income and nutrition.
The defeat in Hiiraan did not come from a pitched battle or overwhelming force by the militants. Instead, it came from empty promises, fractured alliances, and abandoned towns. Al-Shabaab advanced into territory that the state’s own soldiers and allied clans had vacated.
This is not a story of a militant group suddenly growing stronger. It is a story of a government growing weaker, fractured by politics and neglect.
The fall of Mahaas came at a devastating human cost. According to humanitarian agencies, conflict across Hiiraan has displaced over 100,000 people in just two months. In the wake of the fighting in Mahas town alone, nearly 22,800 people have fled their homes as of late July. Seven health facilities across Hiiraan have been forced to shut down, cutting off access to critical medical services. Damaged water infrastructure and road blockages have left entire communities without clean water or humanitarian aid.
With active conflict zones expanding and federal cohesion eroding, the humanitarian crisis in Hiiraan and Gedo illustrates a broader collapse of both governance and protection mechanisms.
To reverse this dangerous trajectory, Somalia’s leaders must act decisively and with honesty. They owe the Ma’awisley fighters and all local defenders tangible support and recognition and restoring meaningful political dialogue and cooperation between the federal government, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and local elders to coordinate security efforts effectively. Also, ending factional fights within the state apparatus and prioritizing national unity against Al-Shabaab. Power struggles must be replaced with joint planning, shared command structures, and mutual accountability.
Without these crucial steps, more towns like Mahaas will fall. More militia units will abandon their posts. Al-Shabaab will continue to fill every void, not because it is unbeatable but because the state remains divided and unreliable.
This is how Hiiraan, and potentially Gedo, were lost, village by village, piece by piece, abandoned not by an enemy’s gunfire but by the very state they once defended.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Somali Stream.