By Jibril Jama Rafle
Since 2013, the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Jubaland administration has been shaped by tension,
mistrust, conflict, and repeated attempts at political reconciliation. The unilateral declaration of Jubaland that year immediately created divisions, as the Federal Government viewed the process as unconstitutional and exclusive.
Soon after its formation, a violent conflict erupted in Kismayo between the Ras Kambooni Brigade and Somali forces trained in Kenya, who later aligned themselves with the Federal Government. Ras Kambooni eventually took full control of the city and established itself as the leadership of the new Jubaland administration.
This moment defined the beginning of a decade-long struggle between Mogadishu and Kismayo over legitimacy, authority, and federalism.
The first major attempt to ease these tensions took place in December 2013 through a Comprehensive Political Agreement between the Federal Government and the Jubba delegation. This agreement was facilitated by IGAD, mediated by Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus; the then Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister and supported by Somalia’s international partners.
The agreement reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty, recognized the leadership role of the Federal Government, promoted inclusivity, and outlined IGAD’s responsibility in supporting political stability and the fight against Al-Shabaab.
The Federal Government formally acknowledged Jubaland as the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), covering the regions of Gedo, Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba.
Ahmed Madobe became the Interim Leader for a two-year period, with responsibility to form an executive council and an inclusive regional assembly. The Kismayo port and airport were placed under the management of the Federal Government, which also led the process of integrating Jubaland-aligned forces into the Somali National Army. The agreement further emphasized reconciliation among diverse groups within the Jubba regions.
Despite its ambition, the 2013 agreement contained serious gaps. One of the key conflicting groups outside Kismayo, which had carried much of the burden of earlier fighting and played a central role in the Addis Ababa discussions, was excluded from the negotiations.
This exclusion made the agreement appear to be primarily between the Federal Government and the Ras Kambooni Brigade, creating mistrust among other local actors. The agreement also failed to explain what would happen after the two-year interim period, leaving no roadmap for how Jubaland would transition into a permanent federal member state.
The executive council of the interim administration was dominated by a single faction rather than being broad-based. Implementation was inconsistent, and concerns grew over the management of port and airport revenues, as well as the stalled integration of local forces. Over time, Ras Kambooni became the dominant security force, which further weakened the spirit of inclusivity envisioned in the agreement.
When the two-year interim mandate ended, Ahmed Madobe organized a unilateral election in 2015. Although the process lacked a clear legal and administrative framework, the Federal Government accepted the result, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud attended the inauguration in an attempt to maintain stability.
Years later, however, tensions re-emerged during President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s administration. In 2019, Ahmed Madobe was re-elected for a second term, but the Federal Government rejected the result, claiming the process did not meet national electoral standards. This triggered a new wave of political disputes and deepened divisions between Mogadishu and Kismayo.
In 2020, as national elections approached, President Farmaajo’s administration presented a second interim offer to Jubaland, proposing that Ahmed Madobe serve another two-year transitional term starting on 14 June 2020. The offer was made under political pressure linked to the upcoming 2022 federal elections.
However, the proposal did not emerge from genuine negotiations between the two sides, and Jubaland’s leadership showed limited enthusiasm for it. International partners, particularly the UN, played an important mediating role, but the agreement lacked political goodwill from both parties. The interim offer did not include a clear roadmap, an implementation mechanism, or a governance framework for the transition.
It also omitted any agreed approach for conducting the next Jubaland election after the interim period and reduced the political role of the Gedo administration and other regional actors. These shortcomings contributed to the 2024 Jubaland election, which was widely seen as non-inclusive and ultimately paved the way for Ahmed Madobe to win a third term.
The lessons from these developments show that lasting political stability between the Federal Government and Jubaland requires early engagement, mutual respect, and a shared understanding of responsibilities.
A sustainable agreement would need to address the legitimacy of previous electoral processes and set a clear two-year interim period agreed upon by all parties. During this interim period, a unified and inclusive executive cabinet representing the major communities of Gedo, Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba should be formed.
In addition, an Oversight Committee established by the Ministry of Interior should monitor the implementation of the political roadmap and provide regular updates to the Federal Government.
At the end of the interim phase, the Federal Government and Jubaland stakeholders should jointly form the permanent regional administration in line with Somalia’s federal principles.
The Gedo administration and the broader Jubaland opposition must be actively included in the political arrangements to prevent the recurrence of exclusion that has repeatedly harmed state-building in the region.
Financial resources should be distributed based on compliance with the agreement, under the supervision of the Oversight Committee. Security responsibilities in strategic areas such as Kismayo should be handled by federal forces, while the Somali National Army should take the lead in securing Gedo. Local customs revenue should support regional development and contribute to national financial priorities.
Finally, any agreement reached should be documented, signed, and publicly released, with international partners witnessing the process to ensure transparency and long-term commitment.
In conclusion, trust-building, inclusivity, accountability, and clear implementation mechanisms are essential for achieving a stable relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubaland. Only through a well-negotiated and jointly managed political roadmap can the region overcome a decade of mistrust and move toward durable peace, cooperation, and effective governance.
Jibril Jama Rafle is an experienced specialist in policy analysis, research, planning, and monitoring & evaluation (M&E), with more than 8 years of progressive leadership experience in the government, humanitarian, and development sectors in Somalia.