In a surprising political turn, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has extended an olive branch to Somalia’s most formidable opposition group: the Forum for Salvation of Somalia, a coalition of influential political veterans.
This bloc, often referred to as Madasha Samatabixinta, includes some of the most seasoned players in Somali politics: former President and Forum Chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; former Parliament speakers Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden and Mohamed Mursal Sheikh; and former prime ministers Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, Abdi Farah Shirdon, Hassan Ali Khaire, and Mohamed Hussein Roble.
Other key members include former presidential candidates and ministers Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and Abdullahi Abukar Haji. The Forum’s secretariat is led by Ambassador Dahir Mohamud Gelle and Dr. Mohamed Jimale Kofi, a former information minister and immigration director. These figures represent a powerful cross-section of Somalia’s political elite, and their recent meeting with the president was anything but routine.
After a private meeting at Villa Somalia, both sides agreed to a 20-day break—a cooling-off period to revisit their talks. The key to this progress was the president’s stated willingness to reconsider Chapter 4 of the Provisional Constitution, the very chapter that sparked the current political crisis.
While the Forum welcomed this move with cautious optimism, political analysts believe President Hassan is doing more than negotiating; he is strategically neutralizing pressure points to strengthen his hand for future deals.
So, what can the president realistically achieve in this short window to close the political divides he faces? Here are five key objectives on his agenda:
1. Easing International Pressure
With Puntland, Jubaland, and the Forum united in opposition, pressure on Villa Somalia has intensified in recent months, especially from key international partners like the U.S., the U.K., and the U.N. These actors have demanded genuine dialogue on constitutional amendments, elections, and the ongoing war against Al-Shabaab.
President Hassan responded by launching consultation forums after Ramadan and again in June. Although initially rejected by the opposition, these efforts opened the door for renewed talks with the Forum. The current 20-day negotiation period serves to silence global criticism, at least temporarily. The real question is how long this political quiet will last.
2. Consolidating the SSC-Khaatumo Administration
Since the conflict in Laascaanood broke out, SSC-Khaatumo forces have regained territory and established a local administration for the first time in 16 years. The president has been heavily involved behind the scenes, viewing the SSC issue as a golden opportunity.
If he can establish a functioning administration aligned with Mogadishu, he will not only strengthen the federal government’s presence but also politically outmaneuver Puntland, which is losing its grip on the region. For Villa Somalia, SSC isn’t just a local dispute—it’s a long-term political asset.
3. Undermining Jubaland from Within
The recent appointment of former commander Abdirashid Janan to oversee stabilization in the Gedo region is not merely administrative; it is strategic. Recent clashes in Beled Hawo between federal and Jubaland-affiliated forces underscore the deepening rift between Mogadishu and Kismayo.
By advancing his agenda in Gedo, President Hassan hopes to install a new local leadership structure that can dilute the influence of Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe. This would give Mogadishu a critical foothold in a region historically outside its direct control. The opposition is aware of this strategy, but the president is playing the long game.
4. Accelerating Voter Registration in Allied States
While managing tensions in Mogadishu, Villa Somalia is simultaneously pushing ahead with voter registration in Galmudug, South West, and Hirshabelle—regions where the president holds significant political sway. The leaders of these states are unlikely to support any electoral roadmap that jeopardizes their power or term extensions.
The rush to register voters is a tactical move. These drives could legitimize the president’s preferred roadmap before any final agreement is reached, creating facts on the ground that are difficult to reverse.
5. Fracturing the Opposition Bloc
Perhaps his most ambitious goal, President Hassan’s quiet outreach to individual members of the Forum appears to be working. Some are rumored to be leaning toward the president’s camp, allegedly encouraging him to buy more time.
The Forum is not as united as it once was. Its members have differing goals: some seek quick political wins, others want power-sharing guarantees, and a few remain committed to replacing the president altogether. This 20-day window may be just enough time for the president to exploit these divisions through mistrust and quiet defections—a process that may already be underway.
Final Word
Sources close to the Forum say they are concerned the president is using delay tactics to consolidate his power rather than make genuine concessions.
They warn that August 10 could be a make-or-break moment for dialogue and a turning point for Somalia’s political future. Until then, President Hassan is making his moves—calmly, strategically, and with a sharp eye on the next chapter.
1 Comment
I read the article and liked it. It has useful information. I think if the opposition is divided, it will be the president’s biggest victory. I advise the opposition to be careful.