By: Abdulrazak Abduljalil Haji
On December 25, 2025, Mogadishu was meant to witness a historic turning point, marking the long-awaited shift from indirect elections to a one-person, one-vote electoral system. For a country emerging from decades of conflict and indirect political arrangements, the moment carried the promise of genuine democracy and renewed public trust. In reality, instead of marking a clear break from the past, the election has sparked a different debate, one that questions whether Somalia is moving toward democratic transformation or simply reshaping old systems of control under a new label of one-person, one-vote.
For many years, the Somali people aspired to directly elect their representatives and end the indirect election led by the political elite, traditional elders, and a small group of delegates in pursuit of fairness, accountability, and meaningful representation. Against this background, the Hassan Sheikh Administration adopted the one person, one vote slogan and launched local elections in Mogadishu.
The elections, held on December 25, 2025, involved 1,604 candidates from 20 political parties competing for 390 seats across the capital’s 16 districts. However, the election was widely criticized as disorganized and poorly managed, which exposed deep institutional weakness and raised serious questions about transparency, fairness, and political neutrality.
As a concerned citizen and observer who participated in the election process, the following issues highlight why the current election model promoted by President Hassan Sheikh will create new political problems rather than help Somalia overcome its long-standing challenges of conflict, extremism, and weak governance.
1. Questions About Electoral Commission Independence
The majority of Somali political actors, including Federal Member States, alleged that the newly appointed electoral commission lacked genuine independence and appeared closely aligned with the political party and administration of President Hassan Sheikh. These concerns were reinforced by the conduct of the head of the electoral commission, Mr. Abdikarim Hassan. He was seen on media attending a government event led by Prime Minister Hamze at a hotel in Mogadishu. In another instance, he appeared alongside the Mayor of Mogadishu at a political campaign event where harsh language was directed at opposition groups. His actions supported the opposition’s claims about the commission’s neutrality.
Electoral commissions are expected to remain strictly non-partisan and avoid involvement in political campaigns, since the credibility of any election depends heavily on the independence, professionalism, and neutrality of the institution responsible for managing it.
2. Controversy Over Political Party Registration
After the election commission announced its plan to register political parties, concerns had emerged about the involvement of the state in determining which parties would be allowed to participate in the election process. Initially, more than 60 parties were part of the process, but only 20 were ultimately approved to compete in the election. Many of the selected parties had limited prior political participation and relatively unfamiliar leadership, while several others led by popular politicians with established political records were excluded.
Again, the political parties selected were widely believed to be financed or indirectly supported by the ruling establishment. This blurred the distinction between the state and political parties, undermining fair competition and creating the perception that any outcome would ultimately favor the government. Instead of leveling the political playing field, the process appeared to privilege parties aligned with the government while marginalizing independent and politically competitive actors.
3. Election Management System Controlled by the Ruling Party
The election management system for the one-person, one-vote election in Mogadishu was another source of controversy. The technological and administrative systems used to manage the election were reportedly designed and operated by individuals closely associated with the ruling political camp. Reports suggest that the company managing the election system isowned by a member of parliament linked to President Hassan Sheikh’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP).
Several parties and political figures raised concerns, pointed out multiple flaws in the system, and demanded that an independent technical audit be conducted by reputable companies. Later, the commission announced that the technical audit was done, but the procurement process of selecting the auditors was still not clear.
Without independent auditing, external verification, or transparent access to the election data management system, the integrity of the vote management system remained in doubt even before election day.
4. Unverified Voter Registry Outside the NIRA Framework
In any country including neighboring African states, a credible voter registry is the backbone of any direct election, and citizens are typically required to present identification issued by the country’s National Identification and Registration Authority to register as voters. In this case, the voter registry was neither transparently published nor independently verified. Instead, the electoral commission itself identified and registered voters without requiring official source documents such as national IDs.
The absence of documented voter registration through the National Identification and Registration Authority raised questions about who was registered and voted, how they were identified, and whether the reported figures reflected actual participation. Without a verified voter roll or electoral register, the principle of one-person, one-vote risks becoming a procedural formality rather than a measurable democratic guarantee.
5. Last-Minute Changes to the Electoral Model
One of the most surprising developments in the Mogadishu elections was the adjustment of the electoral model shortly before election day. While many young candidates vying for district MP seats were campaigning door to door and seeking support from local communities, the commission announced that the election would no longer be conducted through direct candidate voting. Instead, it would shift to a closed-list system in which voters would select political parties rather than individual candidates.
This change, which was not formally announced in advance, gave greater power to political parties over individual candidates, particularly at a time when younger candidates were gaining visibility and support over established political elites who control party structures. These last-minute changes undermined transparency and created conditions that advantage those already in control of the parties.
6. Inconsistent Application of Electoral Law
According to the election law, only districts that existed before 1990 are recognized as official electoral districts. This provision was intended to create a clear legal framework for participation. However, its implementation has been inconsistent and selective.
The electoral commission excluded densely populated districts in the Banaadir region, such as Kaxda, on the grounds that they were established after 1990. At the same time, the commission included their electoral list a newly created district Galcad to participate in the election. This apparent contradiction has fueled widespread debate among Somalis and raised concerns about whether the law is being applied consistently or selectively to favor certain political interests rather than democratic fairness.
7. Allegations of Voter Turnout Exaggeration
The official turnout figures announced by the election commission were met with skepticism by the public and observers, particularly in districts where visible participation appeared minimal, such as Deyniile, Hamarweyne, and Shangani. According to the commission’s announced results, a total of 233,314 voters participated in the election, of which 210,586 votes were declared valid and 22,728 were invalid or spoiled.
On the other hand, reports from political party officials and other observers suggest that the actual number of voters who turned out may have been closer to 80,000, alleging that the commission added more than 140,000 voters to the official count. In Shangani district, for example, the commission announced that 5,637 people voted, which exceeds the 4,254 voter cards issued and distributed in the district.
If accurate, inflated participation figures would serve more as a tool for political legitimacy than as a reflection of genuine civic engagement.
8. Single Ballot Paper for All Districts
In the December 25 election across Mogadishu’s 16 districts, the election commission used a single ballot paper listing all 20 political parties for every district instead of a localized custom ballot paper for every district. It is important to note that only six parties had candidates in all 16 districts, while some parties had candidates in only one or two districts.
What puzzled many observers was that parties that had not fielded candidates in certain districts still got votes from every district and won seats according to the results announced by the commission. These seats were later allocated to President Hassan Sheikh’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). For example, in Kaaraan district, the Dadka Soomaaliyeed Party won a seat with 1,348 votes despite not fielding a candidate there. Similarly, in Heliwaa district, the Cadaalada iyo MidnimadaTIIR Party received 232 votes and won a seat despite not having a candidate. In both cases, the seats won by these parties were ultimately given to the ruling JSP.
It remains unclear how parties without candidates in specific districts were able to get votes and win seats, and why those seats were subsequently allocated to the ruling party JSP.
9. Lack of Clearly Identifiable Polling Stations and Centers
Unlike conventional elections, where polling stations and centers are publicly designated and clearly accessible, the December 25 election in Mogadishu and its results were not based on polling stations and centers. Although the commission published a list of polling centers and stations for each district, and voter cards indicated specific station names, some of which did not exist, voters were still able to cast their ballots at any polling station within their district.
Furthermore, polling stations did not have pre-defined voter lists assigning individuals to specific polling station, where voters would typically sign next to their names. Instead, a manual registry was used, allowing voters to write their names and sign at the point of voting.
The absence of clearly defined and properly monitored polling stations and centers contributed to perceptions of a “ghost electorate” and undermined public confidence in the authenticity of the voting process.
10. Post-Announcement Adjustments to Results
One of the most serious electoral malpractice in Mogadishu’s election involved the alteration and revision of election results after they had already been announced, further damaging public trust. In Waberi case, the election commission initially announced that in Waberi district the Horumar & MidnimoQaran Party had won the election with 2,968 votes, while the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) had received 407 votes.
In spite of that, several days later the commission released revised results showing the opposite outcome; the JSP have received 2,968 votes, while Horumar iyo Midnimo Qaran was given 407 votes. In response, officials from Horumar iyoMidnimo Qaran held a press conference and announced that they were withdrawing from the election process, which they described as a “one-party election.”
In such adjustment, still the election commission did not publicly address or explain the change. Electoral credibility depends on consistency and transparency once votes are counted and declared. Any perceived tampering after results are published raises serious doubts about whether outcomes were predetermined or politically negotiated.
11. Commission Intervention Under the Pretext of Clan and Gender Balance
Somalia’s political context makes clan representation and gender inclusion important considerations. However, reports that the commission intervened in election results to ensure clan balance raised concerns that voter choice may have been reversed by the party and state leadership.
After the election, some candidates from participating parties claimed they were removed from the final list after months of campaigning. They argued that these adjustments were made to accommodate politically connected loyalists who had not actively participated in the campaign process.
While inclusion is an important objective, it should be pursued through clear legal frameworks agreed upon before the election, rather than through discretionary adjustments after votes have already been cast.
12. Clan Tensions and Internal Rivalries
Clan dynamics remain a central factor in Somali politics,operating at multiple levels — from major clan families to sub-clans and smaller lineage groups. The conduct of the election appears to have intensified these sensitivities rather than reducing them.
Critics argue that loyalists of the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party dominated the allocation of seats in several districts, reportedly distributing them largely among their own clan networks. This approach generated accusations of favoritism and deepened tensions between competing clans and sub-clans.
As a result, the election rather than fostering broader political inclusion amplifies existing divisions within Somali society. In some cases, disputes emerged not only between different clans but also within sub-clans whose members felt marginalized or excluded from representation. Such dynamics threaten to erode social cohesion and further complicate Somalia’s already fragile political landscape.
Conclusion
The transition from an indirect electoral model to a one-person, one-vote system represents a historic and necessary step in Somalia’s long journey toward democratic governance. It reflects the long-standing aspiration of Somali citizens to directly choose their leaders, strengthen accountability, and move beyond a system long dominated by elite bargaining and limited participation. Nevertheless, such a significant transformation must be guided by credibility, inclusiveness, and trust. Without these, the promise of direct elections becomes a political instrument rather than a genuine democratic milestone.
Direct elections must prove to be better than the indirect model Somalia has relied on for years by bringing Somali society closer together, not driving it further apart. A credible electoral process has the power to unify citizens around shared national goals and foster trust across political and clan lines. Direct elections should never be used as a tool to consolidate or prolong political power beyond the agreed mandate. Instead, they must serve as a neutral and transparent process that reflects the will of the people while respecting constitutional timelines for political transition and presidential elections. If direct elections are to succeed, they must be anchored in transparency, institutional independence, the rule of law, and equal political opportunity for all actors.
For Somalia to move forward, electoral reforms must deliver a system that is more credible, more inclusive, and more accountable than what existed before. Only then can direct elections fulfill their true purpose of empowering citizens, strengthening national unity, and laying a sustainable foundation for democratic governance.
Abdulrazak Abduljalil Haji is a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist with over 10 years of experience in designing and managing results-based M&E systems for local and international NGOs.