By Abdirahman Dhuxul
Introduction: From Ideological Rivalry to Strategic Restraint
For much of the modern Middle East era, relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states were dominated by ideological rivalry and geopolitical competition. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Tehran was perceived in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and other Arab capitals as a revisionist actor seeking to expand influence through sectarian networks and proxy forces across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and Iran competed as opposing poles of regional power, often supporting rival factions and framing each other as existential security threats. During these decades, some Gulf policymakers privately entertained the notion that Iran’s strategic weakening or even collapse could resolve deep-seated geopolitical competition.
Today, that calculation has shifted. Gulf states are increasingly advocating against direct military conflict with Iran, prioritizing regional stability and risk mitigation over confrontation. This shift reflects structural realities rather than genuine reconciliation.
Three interconnected factors explain this strategic reassessment: economic modernization and lessons from regional instability; energy market vulnerabilities and systemic risk; and regional power balance, including the implications of Iranian collapse for rising Israeli dominance.
Economic Modernization, Stability, and Historical Lessons
The primary driver of Gulf restraint is the imperative of economic transformation. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s diversification strategies signify historic efforts to reduce hydrocarbon dependency and build future-oriented economies driven by investment, technology, tourism, and global integration (1).
These ambitious reform plans depend on stable political conditions. Gulf policymakers have also learned from history that the collapse of a major state often produces profound instability. The 2003 dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime did not produce peace but instead destabilized the region by generating prolonged power vacuums, sectarian fragmentation, militia proliferation, and the eventual rise of extremist movements such as ISIS (2,3).
These dynamics reverberated across borders, undermining security in neighboring countries and complicating regional power balances. The lesson for Gulf leadership is clear: instability breeds insecurity, and uncontrolled collapse of a large neighboring state can create more problems than it solves.
In the context of Iran, a far larger and more complex state, the risks of such instability are magnified. A chaotic unraveling could produce refugee flows, militia proliferation, and new forms of transnational violence, further threatening regional development priorities.
Energy Markets and Systemic Vulnerability
The second major factor shaping Gulf policy is structural vulnerability in global energy markets. Iran’s strategic geographic position around the Strait of Hormuz means it sits astride a chokepoint through which roughly 20 percent of globally traded oil passes (4). Any large-scale military escalation in this crucial corridor—especially one involving U.S. forces attacking Iran—would likely disrupt shipping, escalate insurance costs, and produce sharp price volatility.
Periods of heightened tension have already triggered defensive repositioning and elevated alert levels, reflecting deep fragility in energy-dependent economies. Persian Gulf states recognize that oil price shocks harm long-term economic planning, erode investor confidence, and interrupt infrastructure projects crucial to their development goals. Thus, for Gulf leaders, war with Iran is increasingly seen as a strategic risk with potentially catastrophic economic consequences.
Balance of Power, Regional Security, and the Israel Question
The third and most sensitive dimension of Gulf strategic recalibration concerns regional power distribution, especially the implications of Iranian collapse for Israel’s regional position.
While Tehran is widely viewed as a rival, its presence functions as a counterweight within a multipolar Middle East. If Iran were to collapse or be significantly weakened, the existing balance of competition would become more asymmetric.
Israel already possesses superior conventional military capabilities and deep strategic ties with the United States. In the absence of Iranian influence, Israel could emerge as a more dominant security actor across multiple theaters. This raises concerns among some Gulf policymakers about future security architecture and autonomy, especially if their own defense interests become subordinate to broader agendas shaped by other great powers.
This concern intensified following a rare Israeli military strike in Doha, Qatar, in September 2025, when Israel launched an air attack targeting Hamas leadership within the Qatari capital. The strike marked the first Israeli attack on a Gulf Cooperation Council member state’s territory and drew strong regional condemnation from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and others (5,6).
The incident also challenged assumptions about the reliability of external security guarantees, as Qatar hosts the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base.
Regional responses underscored these shifts: Gulf leaders expressed full solidarity with Qatar, denouncing the attack as a “blatant violation of sovereignty” and a serious threat to regional security and stability (7).
These developments reinforced perceptions among Gulf policymakers that traditional security umbrellas may not fully protect against regional escalation, prompting greater emphasis on strategic autonomy, collective regional mechanisms, and hedging strategies that do not rely exclusively on external sponsors.
Strategic Hedging in a Multipolar Environment
The Middle East is no longer defined by a unipolar security architecture. Instead, Gulf states navigate a multipolar and unpredictable international environment, balancing relations with the United States as a principal security partner, China as a key economic interlocutor, regional powers such as Turkey and Pakistan, and diplomatic engagement with Iran to reduce risks of direct confrontation.
This multidirectional strategy represents strategic hedging—reducing dependency on singular security guarantees while preserving flexibility to respond to shifting regional and global conditions.
The unified Arab and Islamic response to the September 2025 Doha incident, including emergency summits and coordinated diplomatic condemnations, reflected this hedging logic, emphasizing collective regional security frameworks over reliance on distant great powers to manage localized conflict dynamics.
Conclusion: Prudence Over Provocation
The Gulf’s approach toward Iran today is neither naive reconciliation nor unprincipled appeasement. It is a careful recalibration shaped by historical lessons, economic imperatives, and a nuanced understanding of regional power dynamics. Gulf states are navigating the tension between rivalry and pragmatism, recognizing that stability—rather than confrontation—offers the clearest path to sustaining their economic transformation, protecting vital energy interests, and preserving strategic autonomy.
At the same time, regional power balances remain fragile. The potential for sudden disruptions—whether from conflict, external intervention, or the collapse of key actors—ensures that Gulf strategy will continue to evolve. In this shifting environment, engagement, deterrence, and hedging coexist, reflecting a Middle East in which prudence has become the most valuable currency of statecraft, but the future balance remains open, contingent, and far from settled.
Abdirahman Dhuxul writes on foreign policy, state-building, history, and philosophy. He is a political analyst and activist with a Master’s degree in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy from Moi University.
References
1. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Vision 2030 Official Document. Riyadh, 2016.
2. Dodge, Toby. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. London: Routledge, 2012.
3. International Crisis Group. Iraq After ISIS: Security and Political Implications. 2019.
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration. World Oil Transit Chokepoints. 2023.
5. Reuters. “Israel Attacks Hamas Leaders in Qatar.” 9 September 2025.
6. Al Jazeera. “World Reacts to Israel’s Attack Against Hamas in Qatar’s Doha.” 9 September 2025.
7. Khaleej Times. “Gulf Countries Condemn Israeli Attack in Qatar.” 9 September 2025.